Imagined Futures: Feminist Science Studies in an Era of Climate Change Denial by Crandall, Emily K
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
5-2019 
Imagined Futures: Feminist Science Studies in an Era of Climate 
Change Denial 
Emily K. Crandall 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3165 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 


















A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the 



























Emily K. Crandall 
 






Imagined Futures: Feminist Science Studies in an Era of Climate Change Denial 
by 





This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in 
Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree 







Date  Chair of Examining Committee 
  [enter full name here without titles] 



















Imagined Futures: Feminist Sciences Studies in an Era of Climate Change Denial 
by 
Emily K. Crandall 
Advisor: Alyson Cole 
What space is there for critical approaches to science in a context where the authority of 
science to say anything meaningful, or to prescribe, appears to be somewhat tenuous—in other 
words, in a moment of rampant climate change denial? To answer this question against the 
backdrop of the common refrain that the problem is one of capitalism vs. the climate (e.g. Naomi 
Klein 2014), I examine cases where debates about science, economistic organizational 
arrangements, and political clashes between neoliberals and environmentalists come together, 
while insisting on the view, following critical engagements with the sciences, that the sciences 
and their societies co-produce one another. I ask, what visions for the future are bundled in our 
debates about climate science? In response to such queries, I argue in this dissertation that 
recourse to a traditional positivist understanding of science leads us to irresolvable conundrums 
in the context of environmental concerns and in the clash with capitalism. 
As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, political neoliberalism wields the armor of 
science strategically—it cloaks market fundamentalism and its attendant values within it, thus 
redrawing the discursive terms of engagement around ideology rather than knowledge. Center-
left liberals (encapsulated by mainstream climate science and Democratic party politics, who 
often also have a hand in fostering structural neoliberalism) in turn insist on the strengthening of 
scientific authority in response to this attack. I argue that the attachment to neutrality, reason, and 
objectivity as ways to secure scientific authority not only in some ways legitimates the political 
 v 
neoliberal strategy, but also preempts a truly critical, imaginative position – a response that takes 
as its core objective the end of exploitation of human and nature alike. As I show, we need 
feminist engagements with science in order to refuse the neoliberal terms of engagement, and 
crucially to offer new grounds with which to “move on” in politics/knowledge. 
In particular, the first chapter examines how the structural neoliberal arrangement of the 
academy—increased disciplinarity and the dominance of behavioralism—influenced the study of 
politics. Smuggled into this rubric for knowledge production are the values of mid-twentieth 
century anti-communist fervor, namely an ideological commitment to the specific type of 
freedom that the “free market” ostensibly secures. Given the critique of capitalism embedded in 
the anthropogenic climate change thesis, I argue that an updated version of Sheldon Wolin’s 
articulation of the imaginative vision in political theorizing—one that takes seriously the 
feminist, anti-racist, postcolonial critiques of vision and of science—is both the purview of 
environmental political thought, and a necessary rubric for it to harness that which is required for 
a broader, richer, more capacious imagining of the possibilities for the ordering of collective life. 
Specifically, I read Wolin’s account of imaginative vision alongside Donna Haraway’s critical 
feminist account of vision as a cautionary note to environmental political theorists against 
deference to scientific knowledge. 
 In order to address the other modes of neoliberalism at work in contestations over the 
authority of science on questions of the environment—the attendant political rationalities, their 
affects and intensities—I look to two different cases where political neoliberalism infuses 
climate change denial. The second chapter asks whether it is the case that climate change denial 
can be explained as a function of ignorance about science. Given that white evangelicals in the 
United States are the demographic most likely to report high rates of climate change denial, I 
 vi 
turn to philosophical work on epistemologies of ignorance in order to examine the epistemic 
practices of the prominent evangelical community leaders who advocate this view. I demonstrate 
that the success of the evangelical strategy lies in its redrawing of the terms of discourse and 
debate, positioning itself as guardian of the interests of “real science,” and of grounding both of 
these moves in the preservation of the evangelical way of life.  
 The third chapter examines the recurrent phenomena in the 20th century where a 
prominent environmentalist/scientist engaged in a public debate with a political neoliberal critic 
on the subject of whether they had in some way corrupted scientific practice. Turning to critiques 
on the same grounds of feminist philosophers of science, I argue that the insistence on the 
importance of separating ideology from science in climate change debates cloaks the historically 
contingent formations and meanings of reason and objectivity in the guise of neutrality. A return 
to feminist arguments that the body, values, and connectedness are required to give better 
accounts of the world reveals the limitation of this debate constrained by structural neoliberal 
rationality and frustrated by political neoliberal maneuvering. I also argue that environmental 
science and feminist philosophy are important political/methodological bedfellows. To the extent 
that the Anthropocene reconfigures the boundary between human and nature, we should also 
view it as an invitation to re-examine our diagnostic tools.  
 Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which 
norms and concepts of science permeate our political debates and our ways of organizing 
collective life. In the conclusion, I turn explicitly to the concept of imagination, where I argue 
that a critical orientation toward neutrality points us toward feminist futures. In particular, I turn 
to science fiction to argue for broad and adventurous reading practices, playfulness with our 
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Contestations Over the Authority of Science 
 
Photographs circulating in the press and on social media throughout the first years of 
Donald Trump’s presidency depict seas of protestors at the inaugural Women’s March and 
March for Science across the United States, many wielding signs that declare “Science is Real.” 
At the same time, a public debate rages on: is postmodernism responsible for fake news?1 
Trump’s twitter feed is littered with sarcastic quips about the need for “fake” global warming in 
the midst of each new polar vortex weather event, while his administration is staffed with figures 
whose views on climate change range from considering it a hoax to expressing skepticism about 
the degree to which scientists agree on the specifics, or skepticism about the degree to which the 
evidence demands restrictions on the economy.2 At stake in each of these phenomena is a 
political contestation over the authority of science. In this dissertation, I aim to unpack the stakes 
in such contestations, particularly when the uncertain future of the planet is both the landscape 
against which we debate scientific authority and the grounds for the conflicting political and 
economic imaginaries that suffuse these debates. Put differently, I ask, what visions for the 
future are bundled in our debates about climate science? 
The failure to respond to climate change—or the conflict over what an adequate response 
should look like—is widely understood to be a conflict between capitalism and the environment. 
                                               
1 Kenan Malik, “not post-truth as too many ‘truths,’” Pandaemonium, February 5, 2017; Truman 
Chen, “Is Postmodernism to blame for post-truth?” Philosophy Talk, February 17, 2017; William 
E. Connolly, “Fake News and ‘Postmodernism:’ the Fake Equation,” Contemporary Condition, 
May 2018; Victor Davis Hanson, “Fake News: Postmodernism by Another Name,” Hoover 
Institution, January 26, 2017.  
2 Emily Holden and Jeremy C.F. Lin, “Trump’s climate science doubters,” Politico, March 6, 
2018; Emily Holden, “Climate change deniers run the Trump administration,” Politico, March 7, 
2018.  
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This is evident in recent public discourse—from Naomi Klein’s 2014 book, This Changes 
Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, or the proposed designation of the “Anthropocene”3 as a 
new geologic era to recent proposals for a green new deal—but was also pervasive throughout 
the twentieth century. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson released a report from the 
President’s Science Advisory Committee entitled “Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,” 
in which he illustrated precisely this dynamic: 
Ours is a nation of affluence. But the technology that has permitted our affluence 
spews out vast quantities of wastes and spent products that pollute our air, poison 
our waters, and even impair our ability to feed ourselves. At the same time, we 
have crowded together into dense metropolitan areas where concentration of 
wastes intensifies the problem.  
 
Pollution is now one of the most pervasive problems of our society. With our 
numbers increasing, and with our increasing urbanization and industrialization, 
the flow of pollutants to our air, soils and water is increasing. This increase is so 
rapid that our present efforts in managing pollution are barely enough to stay 
even, surely not enough to make the improvements that are needed.4 
  
Affluence, urbanization, industrialization, and technological excess—these are the drivers and 
run-offs of the capitalist economy that are understood to be depleting the resources required to 
maintain capitalist production at existing levels (of excess). At the same time, they are positioned 
as eroding that very quality of life even as they are ostensibly securing it. Technological 
innovation that was supposed to allow us to live longer, healthier, more free lives increasingly 
                                               
3 I will deal more extensively with debates around the “Anthropocene” in chapters one and three, 
but to quickly introduce the term, it describes a new geologic era wherein which human activity 
has exerted an influence over earth-systems, which many scholars date to the industrial 
revolution. As such, part of what is at stake in these debates is the question of whether capitalism 
necessarily poses a threat to earth-systems, or whether this relationship is historically contingent. 
I somewhat sidestep this question in the dissertation, as I focus specifically on the role of 
epistemology in facilitating the conflict between capitalism and the environment.  
4 “Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,” Report of The Environmental Pollution Panel, 
President’s Science Advisory Committee, November 1965.  
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renders access to clean air and water precarious, removes us from food production, and alienates 
us from nature. And massive wealth accumulation through the free market that was supposed to 
alleviate the suffering of poverty has instead concentrated resources in the hands of an 
increasingly smaller few and has justified massive global exploitation.   
To the extent that climate science is responsible for spotting this conflict, diagnosing it, 
and uncovering its consequences, its authority necessarily poses a challenge to the capitalist 
order. If the advocates of capitalism imagine it to be the harbinger of human progress, while 
climate change theses suggest that capitalism is incapable of making good on its promises of 
progressive achievement of human flourishing and on capitalism’s own “natural” regeneration, 
then the challenge that it poses is multivalent: it is a challenge to the myths that sustain and 
infuse the capitalist ethos, a challenge to capitalist practices, and a challenge to capitalism’s 
orientation toward, or relationship with, nonhuman nature. That “science” is somehow 
responsible for naming this challenge is evident even in Johnson’s letter. He continues:  
Looking ahead to the increasing challenges of pollution as our population grows 
and our lives become more urbanized and industrialized, we will need increased 
basic research in a variety of specific areas, including soil pollution and the 
effects of air pollutants on man. We must give highest priority of all to increasing 
the numbers and quality of the scientists and engineers working on problems 
related to the control and management of pollution.5 
 
The formulation is as follows: capitalist practices are eroding quality of life, and in order to 
curtail and restrain these practices, we need to invest (both financially and ideologically) in the 
scientists who can offer us solutions to this erosion. But note the qualities of both “science” and 
“capitalism” at work here. Johnson articulates a mandate for science to “control” and “manage” 
the effects of the status quo’s practices rather than to destabilize or reconfigure that status quo, 
                                               
5 Science Advisory Committee, “Restoring.”   
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rendering capitalism’s growth inevitable, and science as a technique of management for that 
growth. At the same time as climate science, even as articulated by an American President, 
carries an implicit critique of capitalism within it, it still takes place within the purview of 
capitalist economic processes. As such, the dominant understanding of good science as neutral 
and objective combines with its directive as a tool for managing the social order.  
 Consider a more recent example. In a Senate hearing over Representative Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal for a Green New Deal, Senator Mike Lee mocked the proposal as a 
work of science fiction, showing graphics ranging from stills from the Star Wars film franchise 
to President Ronald Reagan riding a dinosaur. He claimed, “Climate change is an engineering 
problem – not social engineering, but the real kind. It’s a challenge of creativity, ingenuity, and 
technological invention. And problems of human imagination are not solved by more laws, but 
by more humans! More people mean bigger markets for innovation.”6 Though Lee sidesteps the 
question of whether anthropogenic climate change is real, his minimization of a proposal that 
proceeds from evidence amassed by climate science, through his insistence on the role of 
markets, is revealing. He draws a distinction between social engineering and “real” engineering 
as a way to also align “real” engineering with “bigger markets,” thus again aligning real science 
with the status quo social order, and perhaps leaving it up to his constituents to draw the line 
between a particular kind of climate science and the undesirable (or even unnatural) order that 
requires social engineering.  
 Though I have begun to articulate this landscape by sketching ways in which capitalism 
and climate change are counter-posed, in unpacking debates about science in environmental 
                                               
6 Katie Bernard, “Sen. Mike Lee says solution to climate change ‘is to fall in love, get married 
and have some kids,’ CNN, March 26, 2019.  
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contexts throughout the dissertation I focus my theorizing on neoliberalism more directly. There 
are several reasons for this. First, in asking what visions for the future are bundled in our debates 
about science, I am not only tracking the material arrangements of the economy itself, but rather 
how beliefs in the “free” market as either the only or the best way to secure human freedom 
(which I refer to throughout as political neoliberalism, a choice I will elaborate below) come to 
infuse a variety of other political positions that pose challenges to the project of adequately 
responding to the threat posed by climate change and to the underlying questions of scientific 
truth and authority, particularly in the context of the United States. The other major reason for 
tracking neoliberalism as opposed to capitalism is as somewhat of a shorthand for describing an 
array of other institutional/organizational arrangements (including those of the academy and 
scientific research) outside of a strict notion of the economy as such, but whose arrangements are 
nonetheless shot through with economistic logics (which I refer to throughout as structural 
neoliberalism).  
This political neoliberalism is a coalition of hard-right conservatives, those who profit 
from the fossil fuel industry, who actively reject the need for a robust (or any) social welfare 
state, and who champion an extreme version of the personal responsibility ethic. Though this is a 
somewhat unusually narrow definition of political neoliberalism, I use it again as somewhat of a 
shorthand in reference to, on one hand, the way that historians of science name the conglomerate, 
coordinated effort to manufacture doubt about first cigarette harms and later climate change,7 and 
on the other hand, as a way to signal the influence of substantive neoliberal thinkers (e.g. 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Julian Simon, and others) on climate change deniers, such as 
the ones whose work lends the views of Trump’s administration their substance. I develop this 
                                               
7 Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010). 
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point below and offer readings of salient dimensions of this political neoliberalism in chapters 
two and three. The other neoliberalism at work involves structural forces such as the increased 
privatization, marketization, and financialization of collective life and of public goods and 
services, especially of media, research, and governance. As I demonstrate throughout the 
dissertation, political neoliberalism wields the armor of science strategically—it cloaks market 
fundamentalism and its attendant values within it, thus redrawing the discursive terms of 
engagement around ideology or bias, rather than around best knowledge practices. Center-left 
liberals (encapsulated by mainstream climate science and Democratic party politics, who often 
also have a hand in fostering structural neoliberalism) in turn insist on the strengthening of 
scientific authority in response to this attack. I argue that the attachment to neutrality, reason, and 
objectivity as ways to secure scientific authority not only in some ways legitimates the political 
neoliberal strategy, but also preempts a truly critical, imaginative position – a response that takes 
as its core objective the end of exploitation of human and nature alike. As I will show, we need 
critical feminist engagements with science in order to refuse the neoliberal terms of engagement, 
and crucially to offer new grounds with which to “move on” in politics/knowledge. 
Critical approaches to the sciences have been urgent for a litany of social justice issues—
many of which share affinities with environmental ventures, such approaches as decolonial 
feminist thought and environmental justice projects.8 Scholars and activists have, for example, 
tracked how social structures such as gender and race impact what becomes publicly considered 
as legitimate scientific knowledge, and have challenged scientific knowledge that has been 
complicit in the systematic oppression of female, non-white, homosexual, non-binary gender 
                                               
8 E.g., Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (New York: Zed Books, 2014); Joni 
Adamson, Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein, Environmental Justice Reader: Politics, Poetics, 
and Pedagogy (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002).  
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identified, or otherwise “deviant” bodies. This poses another way to frame the overarching 
question of the dissertation: what space is there for critical approaches to science in a context 
where the authority of science to say anything meaningful, or to prescribe, appears to be 
somewhat tenuous, such as in the context of rampant climate change denial? To answer this 
question, I examine cases where all of these elements (debates about science, economistic 
organizational arrangements, and clashes between political neoliberals and environmentalists) 
come together, while insisting on the view, following critical engagements with the sciences, that 
the sciences and their societies co-produce one another. I argue throughout the dissertation that 
this view enables us to ask different questions, to read differently, and to imagine alternate 
futures. Further, I argue that recourse to a traditional positivist understanding of science leads us 
to irresolvable conundrums in the context of environmental concerns in the clash with capitalism. 
When we uncritically insist that “science is real,” we neglect the ways that scientism and 
structural neoliberalism are both historically and methodologically intertwined – thereby ceding 
discursive ground to the neoliberal political imaginary, particularly insofar as it deploys Western 
ideas about the hierarchy of knowledges, and the appropriate relationship of humans to 
nonhuman nature. In leaving intact the preference for an objective and detached science as the 
ultimate authority in knowledge production, we also leave intact the logics of mastery and 
possession over nature, and the mandate of science as a tool for the control and management of 
the social order. I develop this argument further in chapters one and three, but to summarize it 
here, scientism is intertwined with structural neoliberalism methodologically insofar as both are 
rendered guardians—through their commitment to the principle of rationality—of the assumption 
that bigger, “freer” markets are a prerequisite for the innovation and ingenuity required for 
progress and for human flourishing. Historically, these arrangements are a function of the post-
 8 
war organization of the Anglo-American academy, and an attempt to distinguish the knowledge 
produced in those academies from that of first Nazi science, and later Soviet science.9 Where 
scientists insisted on reason and objectivity as stalwarts against ideology, they drew on 
democratic norms of openness and competition as required to secure them. I argue throughout 
the dissertation that critical engagements with objectivity, reason, science, and with knowledge 
more generally, are crucial for untangling knowledge production from neoliberal logics.10   
 
Methods and Interventions 
 I am both substantively and methodologically indebted in this dissertation to feminist 
epistemology and philosophy of science—or feminist science studies, depending on the 
disciplinary arrangement.11 I treat this area of scholarship as a mode of intervention into other 
scholarly debates, as a reading practice, and as offering an account of the world in its own right. 
In particular, I draw on and build from two different modes of critical engagement with science. 
On one hand, I deploy the practice of situating dominant scientific norms and practices in their 
social/historical contexts as a way to offer a new reading of our current predicament. On the 
other hand, I look to feminist norms and practices as alternatives to the status quo.  
                                               
9 Sandra Harding. Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Sandra Harding, Objectivity and Diversity: Another 
Logic of Scientific Research (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
10 In this sense, I posit that the relationship between scientism and neoliberalism is not necessary, 
but rather is historically and discursively contingent upon a particularly narrow understanding of 
science. Thank you to John McMahon for flagging this question.  
11 Though in some ways it is a somewhat arbitrary distinction, feminist epistemology/philosophy 
of science is more likely to be found in a traditional philosophy department, and to be a bit more 
traditionally philosophical in writing and argumentation styles, whereas science studies tends to 
be a bit more explicitly interdisciplinary. I use them somewhat interchangeably throughout the 
dissertation, as on my reading, they are substantively and methodologically cohesive. 
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For example, I draw on work on the co-constitution of nature and culture12—scholarship 
that has shown how, in Anne Fausto-Sterling’s terms, “cultural understandings or beliefs, 
whether conscious or unconscious, influence the construction of scientific theory.”13 In other 
words, the theoretical framework within which scientific investigations are interpreted is largely 
influenced by already existing cultural narratives, and further that scientific theory then plays a 
role in defining social concepts and norms. The analysis of the scientists in these studies as an 
example of the influence of cultural understandings on scientific theory is meant not to be a 
commentary on “bad” or biased science, but rather to emphasize that even “good” science and 
consistently valid experiments can be interpreted in ways that in a different time and place seem 
laughable, but that nevertheless have enormous consequences for social and cultural norms. 
What is important for Fausto-Sterling is that there is no causal direction between these cultural 
understandings and the scientific theory. She argues instead that “the relationship between the 
activities of the scientists, their cultural attitudes, the theories they devise, and their effects on 
human biology and social institutions are nonlinear and multidirectional.”14 I use these accounts 
as a practice for reading how historical, cultural conceptualizations of the human relationship to 
nonhuman nature permeate discourse on objectivity in science in the context of debates about 
climate change. The idea here is not to say that we can never know whether climate change is 
happening and human propelled because there is no such thing as objectivity, but rather that 
objectivity itself has particular cultural normative value that is contingent upon a specific 
                                               
12 Anne, Fausto-Sterling, “Society Writes Biology/Biology Constructs Gender,” Daedalus 116, 
no. 4 (1987): 61-76; Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature in the World of Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 1991); Karen Barad, Meeting the 
Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007). 
13 Fausto-Sterling, “Society Writes,” 61. 
14 Ibid, 74.  
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understanding of human subjectivity (relative to nonhuman nature), and thus that claims to it 
often involve the promotion of these particular cultural values, stylized as neutral.  
I also draw on work that articulates specifically feminist epistemic commitments—such 
as those of standpoint theory, intersectionality, epistemic privilege, and epistemologies of 
ignorance.15 These accounts reject notions of a priori scientific objectivity, are critically engaged 
with the location and process of knowledge formation, reimagine nature/culture relations, and 
embrace a more expansive notion of interconnectedness between matter (human and nonhuman) 
and meaning. Feminist science studies, epistemology, and philosophy of science, I argue 
throughout, are necessary lenses through which to overcome the limitations of a traditional 
positivism and to develop the vocabulary, the imagination, and the knowledge necessary for 
adequately contesting notions of freedom delivered through economistic management. Without 
the intervention of both the values and the modes of knowledge production and evaluation 
provided by feminist science studies and epistemology, the climate change debate is vastly 
limited in what it can imagine for the future. This framework further offers an important 
contribution to environmental political thought, suggesting that theorizing climate change should 
include a capacious engagement with the co-constitution of environmental science and 
environmental politics.  
                                               
15 Alison Wylie, “Why Standpoint Matters,” In Science and Other Cultures: Issues in 
Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra Harding, 26-48 
(New York: Routledge, 2003); Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning From the Outsider Within: The 
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986): 14-32; 
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241-1299; Fricker, Miranda, 
Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, 2007; Nancy 
Tuana, “The speculum of ignorance: The women's health movement and epistemologies of 
ignorance,” Hypatia 21, no. 3 (2006): 1-19; Robert N. Proctor and Linda Schiebinger, eds., 
Agnotology: The Making & Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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Mainstream environmental political theory—a somewhat recent subfield that grounds 
questions of how we should organize collective life explicitly in environmental concerns and 
contexts—has dealt with questions of futurity in many different ways. Scholars have used 
climate change as a medium through which to cultivate insights and to test normative and 
empirical premises. Some have engaged in normative debates about the allocation of the global 
atmospheric commons,16 while others have traced the deep connections between climate change 
effects and the difficulty of developing adequate ethical sensibilities as a main source of the 
problem of developing meaningful policy action on the climate.17 Still others have considered the 
ways in which rights claims shape the design of a global policy regime, while critics of this view 
have maintained that liberal conceptions of rights and justice are inadequate for capturing the 
various dimensions of global injustice in global environmental politics.18 Scholars have also 
developed accounts of climate justice for the purpose of mitigating vulnerability – the 
vulnerability both of contemporary populations, for instance in how we can limit the dangers of 
climate change without driving large portions of the world’s population further into poverty, and 
also the vulnerability of future generations.19  If we expand the contours of mainstream 
environmental political theory to include ecomarxism and ecofeminism, scholars have extended 
                                               
16 E.g. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Caney, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and the Social 
Discount Rate,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13, no.4 (2014): 320-342; Caney, “Two 
Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens,” Journal of Political Philosophy 
22, no. 3 (2013): 125-149; and Caney, “Justice and the Basic Right to Justification,” in Justice, 
Democracy and the Right to Justification: Rainer Forst in Dialogue, edited by David Owen, 
147-168 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
17 E.g. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue eds., Climate Ethics: 
Essential Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
18 Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008).  
19 Henry Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014).  
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analyses of domination and oppression on gender, race, and class lines, to an analysis of the 
domination and oppression of nature/the earth.20 Some scholars have articulated the theoretical 
grounds for reimagining human life as intricately intertwined with nonhuman life.21 Others have 
argued that capitalist values of production are deeply in conflict with an ecological worldview, 
and that a plan to mitigate the harms of climate change necessarily entails a challenge to 
capitalist modes of production.22  
While many of these projects are in some sense compatible with my own – which I 
characterize as an exercise in environmental political theory itself – turning to feminist science 
studies contributes several interventions. First, it requires us to take care with our methodological 
tools—even (or perhaps especially) when we take them for granted as neutral. It reminds us to 
ask, as I argue with Donna Haraway in chapter one, “with whose blood were my eyes crafted?” 
Second, it lets us play with the idea of what counts as a text worthy for rigorous interpretation. If 
knowledge is produced, mediated, and disseminated in all of these broad, interconnected ways, 
then we can look for cues to give an account of our world everywhere. Thus, in chapters two and 
                                               
20 John P. Clark, “Marx’s Inorganic Body,” Environmental Ethics 11, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 243– 
258; Paul Burkett, Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s 
press, 1999); Paul Burkett, Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a Red and Green 
Political Economy (New York: Haymarket Books, 2009); John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: 
Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000); John Bellamy Foster and 
Paul Burkett, “The Dialectic of Organic/Inorganic Relations: Marx and Hegelian Philosophy of 
Nature,” Organization Environment 13 (2000): 403-425; Val Plumwood, Feminism and the 
Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993); Val Routley, “On Karl Marx as an environmental 
hero,” Environmental Ethics, 3 (1981): 237-244.  
21 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010); Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).  
22 Robin Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach 
(Albany: SUNY Press,1992); Robin Eckersley, “Socialism and Ecocentrism: Toward a New 
Synthesis,” In The Greening of Marxism: Democracy and Ecology, edited by Ted Benton, 272-
299 (New York: Guilford Press, 1996); Robin Eckersley, The Green State (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004).  
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three, I offer close readings of texts that are outside the usual terrain of political theorizing. And 
finally, in a broad political sense, it reminds us that we need not keep beating our heads against 
the same wall—that we need not continue to engage in debate merely on the terms of preventing 
the encroachment of ideology and bias. Though I am in some sense engaging in that repetition in 
this dissertation by examining these claims, my hope is that I will have cleared the ground for at 
most a refusal of, and at least an ambivalence toward that practice.  
I also draw on and contribute to political theories of neoliberalism.23 Though I do not 
develop an original theory of neoliberalism, I do argue that a turn to feminist science studies 
offers us a new vantage point from which to see how neoliberal forces shape our lives and 
circumscribe what is possible. In making this argument I am indebted to several different 
accounts of the neoliberal political imaginary. That neoliberals fostered a representation of 
“themselves as freedom fighters,” by way of a “starkly market-libertarian meaning of freedom, 
crucially combined with a relentless attack on ‘the social,’” is a key theme throughout chapters 
two and three.24 This imaginary, beginning with Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and others, 
construes collective sovereignty and solidarity as suspicious endeavors posing a threat to 
freedom. That neoliberals saw true human freedom as requiring a discipline governed by reason 
and data, not by centralized government planning is crucial to how I read scientific reason as a 
tool of structural neoliberal governance and discipline.25 Neoliberals also “saw the promise of a 
                                               
23 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Rebellion (Brooklyn: Zone 
Books, 2015); William Connolly, Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal 
Fantasies, and Democratic Activism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Maurizio 
Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2012); David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007).  
24 Wendy Brown, “The Big Picture: Defending Society,” Public Books, October 10, 2017. 
25 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2018).  
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more equal world as both threatening to a rational division of labor between an industrial north 
and an agricultural south and as inviting economic planning on an even larger scale,”26 which 
foregrounds much of their opposition to environmentalism and reluctance to (or rejection of) 
responding to climate change as a coordinated global endeavor. 
The definition of political neoliberalism I deploy in this dissertation captures the point at 
which neoliberal logics infuse a host of other political perspectives, including neoconservatism 
and religious fundamentalism—where market fundamentalism as the bottom line political 
rationality serves as a way to either sidestep the political-moral questions by appealing to a 
rationality that presents itself as neutral to human endeavors (like a positivist scientific 
epistemology also does as I elaborate throughout the dissertation), or to bury the political-moral 
values beneath this supposed neutrality.27 When members of the political class of climate change 
deniers, such as Senator Mike Lee, rely on assertions about the importance of markets for 
securing the goods for human flourishing, laced through with their moral commitments to, for 
example, a traditional patriarchal familial structure, at the same time as they take up the mantle 
of science, they present their values as the ones who do the neutral, rational management of the 
status quo. Whether climate denialism takes the form of Vice President Pence acknowledging 
that human activities have “some impact” on the planet but cautioning lawmakers to “follow the 
science” rather than rush into economic regulations, of former attorney general Jeff Sessions 
claiming that carbon is not a pollutant but a “plant food”—or of energy secretary Rock Perry 
claiming that, “climate’s changing, always has. Man at this particular point in time is having an 
effect on it. How much effect is what’s at debate here. And, more importantly, what is the United 
                                               
26 J.W. Mason, “The Market Police,” Boston Review, June 1, 2018.  
27 Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-
Democratization,” Political Theory, 34, 6 (Dec 2006): 690-714. 
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States going to do to affect that?”—the effect is similar.28 The political rationality at work insists 
that freedom can only be secured through market forces, and renders any challenge to this view 
as irrational, biased, and unscientific.  
Part of the project of this dissertation is to parse out the different ways in which “climate 
denialism” operates. In doing so, I somewhat collapse a number of critically divergent ways of 
characterizing and diagnosing denialism. Some have argued, for example, that believing that 
climate change is a human-propelled crisis is on its own not enough to exempt one from the 
charge of denialism.29 Or in other words, that the failure of Americans to adequately hold their 
elected representatives accountable for climate action, or to adjust their patterns and practices of 
consumption, is itself a form of denialism, regardless of the lip service paid to environmental 
concerns. Though I do not take up these definitional questions in this dissertation, as I am pre-
occupied specifically with what debates about the science signal, I share the view that a broader 
characterization of what counts as denialism is likely required for the project of collective action 
on climate change. I maintain that careful attention to knowledge practices is a vital contribution 
to this project.  
Finally, though I do not take up this line of argument explicitly in the dissertation, I 
should note that I see the reading I offer here as resonating with a decolonial commitment to 
delink the modern distinction between theory and praxis. As Walter Mignolo and Catherine 
Walsh argue, 
Are you not doing something when you theorize or analyze concepts? Isn’t doing 
something praxis? And from praxis—understood as thought-reflection-action, and 
thought-reflection on this action—do we not also construct theory and theorize 
thought? By disobeying the long-held belief that you first theorize and then apply, 
                                               
28 Emily Holden and Jeremy C.F. Lin (2018); Emily Holden (2018). 
29 David, Wallace-Wells. “You, Too, Are in Denial of Climate Change.” New York Magazine, 
December 14, 2018. 
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or that you can engage in blind praxis without theoretical analysis and vision, we 
locate our thinking/doing in a different terrain…If ‘another world is possible,’ it 
cannot be built with the conceptual tools inherited from the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment. It cannot be built with the master’s tools, as Audre Lorde 
reminded us a number of years back, ‘for the master’s tools will never dismantle 
the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, 
but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.’30  
 
I share the view that another world is possible, and in the conclusion of the dissertation I 
elaborate at least two examples of ways in which decolonial projects are involved in what I term 
reframing the terms of engagement.  
 
Chapter Outline 
In chapter one, I ask: How has the study of politics been influenced by these structural 
neoliberal arrangements? How has environmental political thought specifically navigated the 
science/theory divide? And, what are some lessons from feminist science studies on how to 
understand what’s at stake in that methodological division? I argue that a return to Sheldon 
Wolin’s debate with the behaviorists in the twentieth century is necessary. Reading Wolin’s 
account of the imaginative vision of the theorist alongside Donna Haraway’s critical feminist 
account of vision, I argue, should caution environmental political theorists against deference to 
scientific knowledge. This chapter lays the groundwork for explaining the role of scientism as a 
guardian of structural neoliberal institutional arrangements, and for the investigation of specific 
dimensions of political neoliberalism that I take up in the following two chapters.  
In chapter two, I ask whether it is the case that climate change denial can be explained as 
a function of ignorance about science. Given that white evangelicals in the United States are the 
                                               
30 Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh. On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 7.  
 17 
demographic most likely to report high rates of climate change denial,31 I turn to philosophical 
work on epistemologies of ignorance in order to examine the epistemic practices of the 
prominent evangelical community leaders who advocate this view. I argue that to position white 
evangelicalism as merely anti-intellectual and against science does not capture the dynamic ways 
that knowledge is being produced and deployed in this context, nor does it capture all of the 
work that images of good science do in sustaining the metaphors and assumptions that infuse 
climate change denial as a political orientation in our current context. Instead, I find that 
community leaders, in fact, use scientific language and mirror scientific practice in order to cast 
climate science as environmentalism, and environmentalism as not science at all, but as a 
religion in its own right—one that poses a great threat to the evangelist mission, and thus the 
existence of the community. This strategy is made salient through its affinities with political 
neoliberalism both materially—the think tanks within which most of the written work on this 
view is produced and disseminated are affiliated either in name or monetarily with think tanks 
that promote market fundamentalism—and ideologically. At the same time as these community 
leaders engage in discursive realignment of evangelicalism with good science, they also tightly 
knit interpretations of the bible with the promotion of markets as the way to secure the goods 
required to make good on the promise of evangelism. This epistemic formation in turn 
reverberates with the broader political imaginary of climate denialism.  
                                               
31 David M. Konisky, “The greening of Christianity? A study of environmental attitudes over 
time,” Environmental Politics 27, no. 2 (2018): 267-291; Cary Funk and Becka A. Alper, 
“Religion and Science: Highly religious Americans are less likely than others to see conflict 
between faith and science,” PEW Research Center, October 22, 2015; PRRI/AAR Survey on 
Religion, Values, and Climate Change, “Believers, Sympathizers, and Skeptics: Why Americans 
are Conflicted about Climate Change, Environmental Policy, and Science,” November 22, 2014.  
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Chapter three asks after the work the charge of “anti-science” does in climate change 
debates, and analyzes the lessons learned from feminist responses to this charge. Building on the 
analyses of structural and political neoliberalism in the preceding chapters, I argue that feminist 
engagements with reason/rationality and objectivity reveal some of the limitations of climate 
change discourse in its contemporary manifestations, namely that the “anti-science” charge 
serves to uphold the authority of a science whose aims are best pursued by a neutral, rational, 
and objective (read: white, western, male) observer. Thus, an embrace of feminist approaches to 
science provides alternative frameworks for engaging with climate change deniers that do not 
require a commitment to understanding (or preserving an understanding of) science as something 
that happens independently of social structures. In particular, I trace the concepts of ideology, 
objectivity, and reason as they manifest in each of these debates. I suggest that feminist 
engagements with reason and objectivity provide new grounds with which to further public 
discussion about climate change, without recourse to a “Truth” about the nature of things that 
exists outside of our human attempts to discover it. In particular, feminist accounts that engage 
multiple axes of both oppression and analysis—ones that provide grounds complementary to 
similar anti-racist, decolonial projects—are crucial for an engagement with an area of science 
that straddles, or in some sense reconfigures, the traditional divide between human and nature, 
thus in the process reforming its own knowledge practices.   
 Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which 
norms and concepts of science permeate our political debates and our ways of organizing 
collective life. Feminist interventions, in turn, reveal that much of what we accept as inevitable 
or natural can instead be unmade and remade. In the conclusion, I propose some criteria for a 
more imaginative engagement with the questions that arise in the context of climate change and 
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the environment. In particular, I argue for broad and adventurous reading practices, playfulness 
with our tools for inquiry, and insistence on reclaiming the discursive terms of debate. 
Ultimately, the political imaginary best suited to tackle climate change is one that—shorn of 
epistemic commitments to neutrality, reason, and objectivity as techniques for management of 
the status quo—embraces an approach to knowledge that is plural, embedded, embodied, and 





Imaginative Vision in/of Theory: The Theorist in the Anthropocene 
  
“The ultimate weapon of theory, will always be, quite literally, brilliance—that is, enlightening 
the facts so that they speak to concerns about which they themselves are mute.”1 
 
“Vision is always a question of the power to see – and perhaps of the violence implicit in our 
visualizing practices. With whose blood were my eyes crafted?”2 
 
 
 In the mid 20th century, political theorist Sheldon Wolin warned against the dangers of 
methodism in the study of politics. One way to think about Wolin’s warning from the vantage 
point of the 21st century, is as a very prescient warning against the dangers not only of what I 
refer to throughout the dissertation as structural neoliberalism—but also of the fetishization of 
the impartiality of science—for the life of the mind, the production of political knowledge, and 
the cultivation of a collective ethos around the question of how we should live. In this chapter, I 
lay the groundwork for the following two chapters—each of which investigates aspects of the 
political-scientific neoliberal imaginary at work in environmental discourse and debate—by 
examining these questions as they unfolded and endure within the discipline of political science. 
In particular, I look to how those earlier debates about in what the “science” of political science 
consists (as against political theory), have in some ways circumscribed the ability of political 
theory to help us to imagine other possibilities for the ordering of collective life in the face of 
global climate change.  
                                               
1 Sheldon Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001).  
2 Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 575-599. 
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This chapter therefore asks, what is the role of the theorist in the age of the 
Anthropocene? Immediate tensions arise in unpacking the question—to interrogate the role of 
the theorist invites a comparison to the non-theorist, but which? The scientist, practitioner, or 
citizen? Where does one draw these lines? To situate the inquiry in the Anthropocene invites 
further complications—is the Anthropocene a subject for scientific study? Is it a political object? 
Both? Again, are there lines to be drawn? Where, to what end, and by what criteria? This chapter 
explores these questions within the context of the developing subfield of environmental political 
theory. It asks, how and why, in bringing science together with theory, do environmental 
political theorists bridge a much debated divide between the two?  
 I argue that the way into these questions is through the work of Sheldon Wolin. As the 
preeminent 20th century theorist who warned against the dangers of methodism in the study of 
politics, Wolin’s work is instructive for delineating the stakes in this context. His advocacy for 
an approach to political knowledge that engages what he termed the “imaginative vision” of the 
theorist is useful for projects that transcend the disciplinary boundaries that have structured 
knowledge production under the rubric of so-called neutrality and objectivity in the post-war 
Anglo-American university (concepts about which I say more in chapter three), particularly 
projects such as those of an ecological or environmental nature. At the same time, however, 
critical approaches to the positivist sciences have proliferated—from post-colonial, feminist, 
anti-racist, and other critical perspectives—raising questions about the power dynamics that 
hierarchize the neutral sciences over and above other kinds of knowledge. In this chapter, I read 
Wolin from this perspective in order to develop an account of vision and of translation 
appropriate to the theorist in the Anthropocene. I argue that the feminist demand that scientific 
knowledge should be ethically accountable to that which it describes should also be thought of as 
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a demand for the theorist of political life – if scientific life is also political in the broadest sense, 
then political theorists ought to view scientific knowledge and practice as a realm in which to 
practice and play with what Wolin calls the imaginative vision. At the same time, I take heed of 
Wolin’s insistence on retaining a sense of the political as something distinct. Where the 
Anthropocene redraws categorical boundaries and blurs the distinction between scientific and 
political descriptions of the world, environmental political theory (EPT) in turn raises questions 
about publics that supersede or transgress identities, questions with which Wolin was deeply 
concerned.3 
 I propose that EPT is uniquely poised to enact a somewhat updated version of Wolin’s 
conceptualization of vision, one that is indebted to science studies, where vision is understood as 
partial, as a process of translation, as an exercise in imagination, and as grounded in the margins. 
In what follows, I argue that revisiting the figures of “the theorist” and “the scientist” is crucial 
for political questions as they manifest in response to the challenges of our current global 
predicament—namely, global climate change and its relationship to unfettered neoliberal 
capitalism. This in a sense means, as Mark B. Brown has argued, that “by opening up the local 
construction of scientific facts to critical examination, political theorists can help citizens 
respond to the interactions between scientific practices and matters of general concern.”4 But it 
also means that contending with practices of knowing generally should be part of the project to, 
as Wendy Brown puts it, insist on the political.5 Or put another way, that contending with the 
                                               
3 Wolin, Sheldon. “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation.” In Vocations of Political 
Theory, edited by Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino, 3-24 (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
4 Mark B. Brown, “Conceptions of Science in Political Theory: A Tale of Cloaks and Daggers,” 
In Vocations of Political Theory, edited by Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino, 206 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
5 “At the Edge,” Political Theory, 30, 4 (August 2002): 556-576. 
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local construction of scientific facts should be thought of as its own terrain for political 
theorizing and as of core concern to navigating political theory’s own inter/intra-actions, 
conflicts, and collusions with science(s), including the technical, economic, and social sciences.  
 The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section examines some recent trends in 
environmental political theory, particularly regarding its relationship to climate science. It is 
common to encounter scholarship under the auspices of EPT that spends extensive time 
discussing climate science as a way into a set of political problems or questions. Following 
Wolin, I argue that this mode of engaging science shares some methodological features with the 
form of methodism with which Wolin was concerned. In particular, that it is deferential to the 
descriptions of the world authorized through the scientific method, and as such somewhat 
beholden to the status quo. The second section turns to Wolin’s debates with the behavioralists in 
the 1960s, where I parse out both his critique of methodism, as well as his account of the kind of 
political knowledge that theory produces, as against the kind of political knowledge that 
behavioralism produces. I argue that he should be understood as cautioning the theorist against 
this deference to the knowledge produced by scientific criteria. The third section turns to the 
work of feminist scholar Donna Haraway, in order to ground Wolin’s account of the imaginative 
vision of the theorist in the feminist critique of science, and in feminist debates over the concept 
of vision. I argue that where Wolin was optimistic about the role of theory to “enlighten” the 
facts, as in the quote from the epigraph of this chapter, Haraway asks us to understand facts not 
as mute to the concerns of the contexts in which they emerge, but as inextricably bound in them. 
This is not to say that science and theory should both be thought of as similarly constructed all 
the way down, but rather that political theory has both an obligation to and a unique perspective 
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on questions regarding power and domination in technologies of seeing—whether these 
technologies are political, scientific, or both.  
 
Environmental Political Theory and the Scientific Imagination 
 Environmental political theory takes many shapes, but two broad approaches to 
ecological challenges are of interest here. The first is to ask something like: what resources can 
we mine from our “epic theorists” (following Wolin) to help us understand our current 
predicament?6 The second strategy asks something like: how do we revise or deploy our political 
theories and concepts in light of our current predicament?7 The efforts in response to the first 
question generally take up one of two directions. Theorists will ask questions about how the 
histories of concepts like human, nature, and world in the various theories we have inherited can 
help to clarify and reframe how we ought to understand what our predicaments are, or from 
where they originate. Theorists will also ask how our understandings of political crises can be 
applied to ecological crises—to what extent are ecological crises also crises of justice, 
democracy, or participation, for example. This second kind of question sometimes dovetails with 
the question of revising our political theories and concepts. If ecological crises are to an extent 
                                               
6 Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley eds., Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Andrew Biro ed., Critical Ecologies: The 
Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 
2011); Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); 
Peter F. Cannavo and Joseph H. Lane Jr, eds., Engaging Nature: Environmentalism and the 
Political Theory Canon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
7 Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle 
Against Climate Change Failed and what it Means for Our Future (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Henry Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Robyn Eckersley ed., Environmentalism and Political Theory: 
Toward an Ecocentric Approach (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). 
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crises of democracy or participation, how then ought we to reformulate our political concepts to 
address these crises?8 Scholarship in this vein deals with concerns about responsibility, 
distribution, coordination, and other ethical/procedural considerations.  
 Within these two broad approaches, I locate two modes of engagement with climate 
science. The first I characterize as the mining of climate science for the pursuit of political theory 
projects – scholars begin with the science of climate change (reduction of biodiversity, 
atmospheric calculation, carbon storage, etc.), and revise or extend political concepts in light of 
this scientific research. Ecological modernization, environmental economics, green liberalism, 
market environmentalism, sustainable development, and growth/degrowth debates are all 
examples of this current.9 The second I characterize as a more critical engagement with science 
(often emanating from the critical theory tradition) – these scholars ask to what extent 
ecological/environmental issues are also social/political problems of domination/exploitation, 
and what can critical theory tell us about our current predicaments? Biocentrism, bioregionalism, 
deep ecology, eco-feminism, eco-socialism, environmental justice, and social ecology generally 
fall under this current.10 My interest in returning to Wolin in this context is primarily in response 
to projects of the first type—the mining of climate science for the pursuit of political theory 
projects. I argue that when political theorists either attempt to develop or refine political theories 
that are empirically testable within the contexts of climate change, or to engage the political 
landscape of the development of climate science and climate response, they may also be limiting 
                                               
8 Robin Eckersley, The Green State (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).  
9 E.g. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. 
10 E.g. Andrew Biro, ed., Critical Ecologies; John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism 
and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000). 
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the capacity of political theory to help us make sense of the incoherence and contradictoriness of 
experiences that characterize the landscape of both ecological challenges and the study of them. 
 Consider two examples: Steve Vanderheiden’s 2008 book Atmospheric Justice: A 
Political Theory of Climate Change; and Dale Jamieson’s 2014 book Reason in a Dark Time: 
Why the Struggle Against Climate Change Failed – And What it Means for our Future. In each 
case, the scholar in question is trained in the tradition of political theory or political philosophy, 
attempts to offer a rigorous philosophical account of our current predicament, and gestures 
toward a series of potential solutions to address this predicament. Notably, each book begins 
with an extensive treatment of the landscape of climate science. Jamieson notes in his preface, “I 
am a philosopher by disciplinary training but some of my colleagues will have a hard time 
recognizing this as a philosophy book. I can only say when it comes to thinking about the real 
world (an exercise in what philosophers call ‘non-ideal theory’), the facts matter. So does 
history. It is important to situate the subject under investigation in the world of our shared 
experiences.”11 The first substantive chapter of the book goes on to situate the nature of the 
problem (global failure to respond to climate change) in the transition from the development of 
climate science, to climate change as a public issue and area of diplomacy. The second chapter 
explores the extent to which scientific ignorance and the politicization of science have played a 
role in establishing “obstacles to action.”12 
 Vanderheiden’s book opens with a chapter entitled, “the politics of climate change 
mitigation,” as a way of introducing a problem to which he goes on to offer six different 
theoretical frameworks for exploring, including: a doctrine of fairness; international justice; 
                                               
11 Jamieson, Reason, ix. 
12 Ibid 61; I respond to this argument specifically in chapter 2.  
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intergenerational justice; and three different frameworks for distributing responsibility. 
Revealingly, this introduction is not just a history of climate change policy, but rather a history 
of the relationship between the scientific discovery of the greenhouse gas effect and the 
subsequent political landscape in which this discovery was either dealt with or not. Early on in 
the chapter he notes:  
Before continuing our examination of global climate policy development, we 
might briefly examine the current state of scientific knowledge as assessed and 
disseminated by the first four IPCC assessment reports, laying out the basics of 
what we now know about the causes and likely consequences of anthropogenic 
climate change. The primary controversies within climate science today concern 
not the existence of what Arrhenius called the ‘hothouse’—the heat-trapping 
effects of atmospheric GHGs and the anthropogenic causes of their increased 
atmospheric concentrations are no longer genuine controversies—but instead 
what the various effects of higher atmospheric concentrations of the various 
GHGs are likely to be. I examine some of those predicted effects below, and later 
consider in greater detail the proper role played by the remaining scientific 
uncertainty surrounding some of those effects, but first I briefly review the current 
state of scientific knowledge about the problem.13 
The chapter then goes on to distill extensive scientific conclusions regarding the role that fossil 
fuels play in raising the earth’s average surface temperatures, effects on global sea levels, and 
shifts in plant flowering, bird breeding, and insect emerging seasons, among other things.  
 My question is, what should we learn from this phenomenon where a political theorist 
must develop a fluency, or at minimum a proficiency, in the language, methods, and debates of 
climate science in order to ask and answer questions about the politics at stake in this landscape? 
On one hand, it gestures to the deep imbrication of political and scientific knowledge required to 
give a better account of our world, particularly in the ecological context; or put differently, it 
suggests that ecological “objects” are constituted through both scientific and political practices. 
On the other hand, there is a way in which political knowledge of a theoretical nature often 
                                               
13 Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice, 6.  
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defers to scientific knowledge in this context. For Vanderheiden, the contestation over predicted 
effects of higher atmospheric concentrations of GHGs is prerequisite background for the account 
of atmospheric justice—the force of the political claim/project relies on the accuracy and nuance 
of the science. For Jamieson, the failure to respond to climate change is essentially a failure to 
either understand or to take heed of the science—where politics intrudes is after the science, as it 
were. Is there anything lost in this deference? I argue that Wolin’s defense of the kind of 
knowledge that political theory produces serves as, at minimum, a cautionary note for this 
practice. 
 
Sheldon Wolin vs. the Behavioralists 
In his famous 1969 essay “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Wolin set out to examine 
what he saw as the “primacy of method in the study of politics,”14 as a way to think through the 
relationship between the “behavioral revolution” in political science in general and the subfield 
of more “traditional” and historical political theory. Working against the backdrop of the 
professionalization of the discipline – the American Political Science Association’s original 
grant of the relationship between political theory and political science relied on an insistence that 
the value of political theorizing was as a conceptual resource for the impartial analysis of 
political phenomena – Wolin was concerned over the ability of the discipline to adequately and 
effectively evaluate and challenge the status quo. The APSA constitution, for example, explicitly 
                                               
14 Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 
(1969): 1062.  
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stipulated that the association would “not assume a partisan position upon any question of 
practical politics.”15 
Wolin ultimately argued that the preference for this version of methodism contributed to 
a lamentable impoverishment of the study of politics and of political knowledge. His argument 
hinged on three important moves that bear mention for the current discussion—a discussion of 
the history of the idea of method, with a particular focus on the intellectual relationship between 
Descartes and the contemporary methodists; an analysis of how “method” is deployed 
specifically by the behavioralists; and finally, a reading of the way that knowledge produced 
through methodism differs in substance and reach from that of political theory. Taken together, 
these moves contextualize his skepticism of the preference for a form of political knowledge that 
is characterized by the “search for rigorous formulations which are logically consistent and 
empirically testable,”16 over a form of political knowledge that is mindful more so of the 
“incoherence and contradictoriness of experience.”17 
For Wolin, Descartes is the intellectual figure that on one hand offers a philosophical 
account of the stakes of the current conflict between bios theoretikos and vita methodica in the 
study of politics, and on the other hand demonstrates the paradox of this conflict. Whereas for 
the Greeks, and well into the Middle Ages, philosophia and theoria were in the business of truth-
seeking while methodus was in the business of ordering that which was already known—for 
Descartes, the significance of method extended well beyond the “simple advantages of economy 
                                               
15 John G. Gunnell, “The Founding of the American Political Science Association: Discipline, 
Profession, Political Theory, and Politics,” The American Political Science Review 100, no. 4 
(Nov 2006): 482. 
16 Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory,” 1070. 
17 Ibid, 1070. 
 30 
and efficiency of mental effort.”18 Wolin reads Descartes as conceiving of method as a form of 
discipline to prime the mind for its truth-seeking efforts. At issue in Descartes’ preference for 
rational method over inherited knowledge, for Wolin, is the way in which this preference renders 
its political commitments as neutral and thus as rational. When Descartes aligns the most 
moderate morals with a rational methodism, the political status quo and existing arrangements 
are taken to be the expression of what is most reasonable. Wolin argues that the state of political 
science in the wake of the behavioral revolution employs a similar justificatory mechanism. 
“Despite occasional deference paid to ‘the tradition of political theory,’ there is a widely shared 
belief that the tradition was largely unscientific where it was not antiscientific and that the 
defining characteristic of a scientific revolution is to break with the past.”19 For Wolin, the 
danger here is that the political scientist will tend to follow the path of marking what already 
exists “the most moderate” (and consequently the most reasonable), thus utterly foreclosing a 
“genuinely theoretical” discussion that might levy critical questions and reflections on the 
existing system as a whole.20 
For Wolin, the behavioralists in the study of politics were guilty of both a historical 
inaccuracy, and of a political transgression. Where the behavioralists heralded themselves as the 
harbingers of a scientific revolution in method, Wolin argued that they misunderstood the 
significance of their own revolutionary project. The preference for behavioralism alone was 
hardly a paradigm shift in the study of politics, but the insistence on behavioral explanations as 
expressive of a scientific project was indeed quite influential as it rendered the scientific study of 
politics as the new definition of the vocation, including imbuing it with what was considered to 
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be the ethic of science: “objectivity, detachment, fidelity to fact, and deference to intersubjective 
verification by a community of practitioners.”21 The problem of this approach is two-fold on 
Wolin’s view. On one hand, it lets the scholar of politics off the hook for offering either a critical 
analysis, commitment, or choices regarding the “quality, direction, or fate of public life.”22 On 
the other, it authorizes the view from nowhere in a way that is antithetical to political life and 
practice. He argues, “the alleged neutrality of a methodist’s training overlooks significant 
philosophical assumptions admittedly incorporated into the outlook of those who advocate 
scientific inquiry into politics…for the employment of method assumes, even requires, that the 
world be of one kind rather than another if techniques are to be effective.”23 This means that the 
questions a methodist can ask are limited to a search for regularities, patterns, and predictions—
again, leaving incoherence and contradictoriness in experience, at least unaccounted for, at most 
as hostile to the relevant epistemic criteria.   
 Wolin’s intervention into debates over behavioralism was in a sense foregrounding some 
of the later debates in the discipline about situating theory in the practice of inquiry, following 
discussions in philosophy of science proper about in what science consists, and how science 
develops.24 The development of theoretical realism, for example, is precisely illustrative of his 
concern that theory would be limited to merely a set of tools for the description of empirical 
phenomena. The attribution of theories’ failure to correspond with or to effectively capture 
empirical phenomena as a problem-in-theory rather than a problem-in-world, in part explains the 
proliferation of subfields of or designations within political theory, in addition to explaining the 
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relegation of certain theories to other, non-theoretical, subfields of political science (e.g. IR 
theory in the subfield of international relations).25 The strength of theorizing as Wolin 
understands it—which he also refers to as “tacit political knowledge” borrowing from Karl 
Polanyi—is that it is not beholden to the criteria of operationalization, and as such can and 
should be directed toward that which is politically appropriate. 
 
Situated Knowledges and the Vision of the Theorist 
 In a now-classic essay published in 1988, feminist scholar Donna Haraway invoked 
debates about scientific objectivity constituting the emerging field of feminist science studies to 
offer her own conceptualization of “situated knowledges.” Situated knowledges, she argued, 
require and encourage a self that is contradictory and split, one who can interrogate positionings, 
as well as require that the objects of knowledge be pictured as interactive actors and/or agents, 
rather than passive and enslaved (to the truth of the world, or to the observer). At the outset of 
the essay, Haraway formulates the problem, to which situated knowledges responds, as follows: 
So, I think my problem, and ‘our’ problem, is how to have simultaneously an 
account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing 
subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for 
making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ 
world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of 
finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and 
limited happiness.”26 
 
And further down, “Natural, social, and human sciences have always been 
implicated in hopes like these. Science has been about a search for translation, 
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convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality – which I call reductionism 
only when one language (guess whose?) must be enforced as the standard for all 
translations and conversions. What money does in the exchange orders of 
capitalism, reductionism does in the powerful mental orders of global sciences. 
There is, finally, only one equation. That is the deadly fantasy that feminists and 
others have identified in some versions of objectivity, those in the service of 
hierarchical and positivist orderings of what can count as knowledge.27 
  
What are the implications for political theory as Wolin understands it of Haraway’s injunction to 
hold on one hand, an account of knowledges’ historical contingencies (including the preferred 
modes for asking and answering questions about the world in a given time) alongside, on the 
other, a commitment to shared political projects of emancipation (broadly construed and 
multivalent)? Haraway proposes a version of feminist objectivity for science that I argue reflects 
shared concerns with Wolin’s theorist. On one reading, Haraway’s assessment of the problem 
facing feminists over how to engage critiques of critiques of objectivity already sounds familiar 
to the theorist working in the tradition of Wolin. “Traditional” political theory is rife with 
interpretations and translations of thinkers and phenomena embedded in particular moments in 
time, and debates over how/whether to extend certain works, insights, and conclusions into our 
own moments and contexts, and for various political projects. However, I argue that Haraway’s 
formulation of the problem of the science question in feminism is most important for revisiting 
the metaphor of vision for the theorist. Haraway’s call to the theorist should be understood as to 
attend to collective historical subjectivity, and at the same time to hold oneself accountable to the 
limits of the sensory system of vision—put differently, to think of the “we” and the “here” of the 
political world as not just a subject to be theorized, but as actively entangled in question-asking 
itself. And further, she asks of the theorist to be responsible to the situated nature of inquiry—to 
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actively resist/reject the view from nowhere. In what follows, I explore the consequences of this 
entreaty for environmental political theory.  
 Haraway argues that the problem of “objectivity” for feminist inquiry is at once a 
problem of paranoid fantasy, while at the same time highlights a common feature of the 
dynamic, heterogeneous, and overlapping sciences (exact, physical, natural, social, political, 
biological, and human)—that feature being a concern with the faithfulness of our accounts to a 
“real world,” leaving aside how mediated or contested both “real” and “world” may be.28 And 
yet this feminist paranoia about the exclusivity of the objectivity project is also real. It is all too 
clear that the form of detached objectivity lauded as the achievement of Western progress in 
scientific thinking is specific and partial, not inevitable and universal after all. Haraway notes 
that feminists have often been trapped between the two poles of on one end, revealing the 
historical contingency of objectivity, and on the other, of searching for a real account of the 
world—or in other words, finding themselves stuck between choosing a radical social 
constructionist view, or searching for a feminist version of objectivity. Haraway offers her 
account as a way to intervene in the dispute between these two poles.29 The problem with the 
radical constructivist view, as Haraway tells it, is that it carries its own mechanisms of 
reductionism. “The strong program in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely and nasty 
tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical nature of truth, including 
scientific truth. History is a story Western culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable 
                                               
28 Ibid, 591. 
29 In part, she is arguing against Patricia Hill Collins’s engagement with objectivity that I draw 
on in chapter three, but I read them both as pre-occupied with the question of how to give a 
better account of the world, and as such I do not take up their explicit disagreements with one 
another here.  
 35 
text and a power field; the content is the form. Period.”30 Put another way, when everything is 
always and only rhetorically seeking or codifying power, the ability to say anything meaningful 
about the world comes into question. On the flip side, those who sought a feminist objectivity or 
feminist empiricism found themselves needing to overly align with the existing theories of 
science. “Here, we, as feminists, find ourselves perversely conjoined with the discourse of many 
practicing scientists, who, when all is said and done, mostly believe they are describing and 
discovering things by means of all their constructing and arguing.”31 In other words, feminists 
insist on some use for objectivity such that scientists who have not thought about the historical 
contingency of knowledge production are then let off the hook—it never becomes necessary to 
interrogate the practices of domination and patterns of privilege and oppression that constitute 
(or have constituted) their own constructions and arguments. That particular contingency, the 
replication of domination and oppression, is left unexposed. 
 So, here we are – stuck between radical social construction and feminist objectivity, or 
between not saying anything “real” about the world and not giving an adequate account of 
domination and oppression – when we encounter Haraway’s proposal from the outset of this 
section. Haraway suggests that in order to hold on to these commitments that seem to be 
contradicting and irresolvable, and to avoid conceptualizing these commitments as binary 
oppositions, we revisit and reclaim the metaphor of vision. While the “gaze” recalls to the ears of 
feminists the sound of the “unmarked positions of Man and White,”32 insisting on the embodied 
nature of the sensory system of vision marks, and thus locates this gaze in the sciences of 
militarism, capitalism, and colonialism. Haraway proposes that we consider the proliferating 
                                               
30 Ibid, 577. 
31 Ibid, 579. 
32 Ibid, 581. 
 36 
technologies for seeing, as well as for learning about the different ways that eyes function, as an 
allegory for a feminist version of objectivity. “All these pictures of the world should not be 
allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability but of elaborate specificity and difference 
and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another’s point of view, 
even when the other is our own machine.”33 So, part of what we’re up to then when we engage 
with the knowledge produced by and through sciences and their technologies (including political 
and social sciences and technologies), is to consider the “how” of seeing, and how then what is 
seen is mediated (or translated) through those visual technologies and processes.  
Importantly for Haraway, even when we are not talking about sex/gender and the body, 
this is a specifically feminist project in two respects. It is feminist in so far as it rejects any 
particular standpoint as the ultimate ground. “There is no single feminist standpoint because our 
maps require too many dimensions for that metaphor to ground our visions. But the feminist 
standpoint theorists’ goal of an epistemology and politics of engaged, accountable positioning 
remains eminently potent. The goal is better accounts of the world, that is, ‘science.’”34 And it is 
also feminist in so far as it resists dominating the object of study. “Feminists, and others who 
have been the most active as critics of the sciences and their claims or associated ideologies, 
have shied away from doctrines of scientific objectivity in part because of the suspicion that an 
‘object’ of knowledge is a passive and inert thing. Accounts of such objects can seem to be either 
appropriations of a fixed and determined world reduced to resource for instrumentalist projects 
of destructive Western societies, or they can be seen as masks for interests, usually dominating 
interests.”35 This concern, to both give a better account of the world at the same time as attending 
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to practices of domination in knowledge production, is a concern that environmental political 
theorists should also heed. We should think of the goals of this standpoint as follows: to produce 
accountable political knowledge about our ecological predicament that is embodied and multiply 
situated, that actively resists Western modes of domination and oppression (including of nature), 
and that is usable for the projects of, as Haraway puts it, “finite freedom, adequate material 
abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness.”36 We should also ask what 
other mechanisms of vision are complementary to these projects, especially in so far as the 
conditions that constrain each are complex, material, and overlapping. 
It is worth noting that Haraway’s injunction to reclaim vision is not without controversy. 
Metaphors related to vision have appeared and been critiqued in many kinds of scholarship and 
political projects. Perception, recognition, witnessing, blindness, theater, and spectators are 
critical metaphors one encounters across both philosophy and political theory, for example.37 
What I have in mind here in returning to vision, though, is primarily a methodological concern 
whose political insights, as Wolin argues, “depend for its richness on the resources from which it 
can draw.”38 This is a concern I argue that feminist science studies and environmental political 
theory share. To the extent that environmental political theory is consumed with the dual task of 
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on one hand, giving a better account of the world, and on the other, generating prospects for a 
better future, Haraway’s call is crucial for situating the theorist in relation to the scientist.  
 I suggest here that reclaiming vision in the way Haraway suggests helps to sharpen 
Wolin’s use specifically as political theory engages questions of time, place, and world history in 
the environmental context.39 My use of “world history” here follows a problematic set up by 
Wendy Brown in a 2002 essay entitled “At the Edge.”40 Brown argues that one of the difficulties 
facing political theory at the turn of the 21st century lies in the proliferation of “forces” and 
“orders of existence” that challenge the boundedness and autonomy of the political. Political 
actors, institutions, identities, and problems are increasingly shaped by that which was once 
marked as outside the political—“economics, culture, nature, the bodily, the domestic, the social, 
the civil, and the local.”41 Where world history and political theory collide then, is over the 
question of whether the Western canon’s understanding of itself as transcending history renders 
it irrevocably of the past (this question is especially potent for environmental political theorists.) 
Brown is concerned about the ways in which these world historical developments have corroded 
and dispersed the political. She calls for “deliberate and careful transgression, risk, and 
interdisciplinary adventurousness”42 in order to recuperate the political by “cultivating a political 
orientation for our work, foregrounding concern with the question of how collective life is 
ordered, what power and possibilities it harbors, what prospects exist for advancing the values 
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we argue that it should feature.”43 An embodied and situated account of vision, following 
Haraway’s invocation, seeks to do just that.  
 Wolin articulated the vision of/in political theory in its relations with what he called 
“political space.” Because political philosophers have deployed metaphysical terms such as 
“time,” “space,” “reality,” or “energy,” without reference to the world of natural phenomena, we 
should think of them as engaging in a conversation about the contours and specificities of 
political time and political space.44 The tight relationship between a distinctive identity and a 
geographical space, for example, had been foundational for the evolution of political and 
national consciousnesses. Wolin argues that we might think of all political theories as 
reorganizing space in so far as they work to structure public life in a particular way, or in so far 
as they view public life as already structured in a particular way. For him, the varied conceptions 
of political space throughout political philosophy are an indicator that each theorist brings “a 
particular angle of vision” to bear on delineating and elucidating the political world.45 Though he 
links the angle of vision to the theorists’ location (“where the viewer ‘stands’”),46 the standpoint 
differs from the feminist standpoint in Haraway’s work. Similarly to Haraway, however, Wolin 
ties the descriptive and the imaginative tightly together under the rubric of vision, though 
Haraway delineates this difference as the rational and the imaginary.47  
 For Wolin, coupling the descriptive and imaginative aspects of vision together bears on 
the relationship of political philosophy to natural philosophy/natural sciences in the wake of the 
scientific revolution(s) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The imaginative element is 
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required of the observer to politics, differently than the observer of the natural world, particularly 
as this observer is preoccupied with the meaning of political life and arrangements. That Wolin 
saw the absence of imaginative vision as problem for the scientific study of politics, but not of 
the natural world, is a key point for turning to Haraway in the context of the Anthropocene.  
But for Wolin, the imaginative is not “merely a methodological convenience which 
enabled the theorist to handle his materials more effectively.”48 The imaginative vision has been 
“the medium for expressing the fundamental values of the theorist; it has been the means by 
which the political theorist has sought to transcend history.”49 For Wolin, this is an expression of 
the theorist’s dealings in possibility. While theorists are trying to describe the world as it is, the 
generalizations they make do not allow them to offer exact predictions (such as ones generated 
by the laws of physics, for example). But in so far as they do engage in “posting warning,” 
theorists are also stating “the necessary or sufficient conditions for attaining ends which, for one 
reason or another, are deemed good or desirable.”50 Here is, I think, where Haraway’s call is 
most instructive. 
 Where Wolin sees the theorist’s attempt to transcend history, Haraway cautions us 
against knowledge that purports to be everywhere and nowhere. She rejects the conceptual 
framing of relativism and objective scientific authority as opposite poles of knowledge. On her 
view, both are knowledges of dislocation. The theorist has an obligation then to deal in vision 
(both descriptive and imaginative) that is grounded in position(s) in time and place. Insofar as the 
theorist is occupied with reorganizing political space, she has an obligation to seek out the 
view(s) from outside and from below. Where Wolin argues that because the field of politics is 
                                               
48 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 19. 
49 Ibid, 19.  
50 Ibid, 14.  
 41 
radically created, reducing political knowledge to the facts of political life is a circular 
procedure, Haraway asks us to also be mindful of the deep historic link between reductionism 
and domination and oppression. She instructs us to ask, “with whose blood were my eyes 
crafted?”51 
 For the environmental political theorist, these issues become all the more acute given our 
current ecological challenges. How and from where do we locate the kinds of vision we need to 
understand our current predicament, and to insist on its relationship to the political and to the 
communal (to offer an account of collective life)? Consider an example. In the introduction to a 
collection of essays entitled Engaging Nature: Environmentalism and the Political Theory 
Canon, the editors sketch out the aims of environmental political theory as follows: 
“Environmental political theory aims at a deeper understanding of human relations with the rest 
of nature, challenges mainstream political theory to recognize environmental concerns, 
challenges environmental ethics to consider political and social context, and interrogates the 
often unexamined assumptions and conclusions of environmental activists. While generally 
sympathetic to the aims of the environmental movement, environmental political theorists are not 
bound by these goals and try to prioritize intellectual rigor above ideological commitment.”52 It 
is noteworthy that only the environmental activists are guilty of having unexamined assumptions 
and conclusions! But this is a revealing mission statement for environmental political theory in 
other ways as well. It is possible to imagine a biologist, an environmental scientist, or even a 
physicist as offering an account of their work as driving toward a deeper understanding of human 
relations with the natural world. There is nothing that claims that task as unique to the theorist, 
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except insofar as it is coupled with explicit challenges both to other political theorists in general 
and to philosophers of ethics--another feature of the entrenchment of disciplinarity. Further, to 
task oneself with the interrogation of unexamined assumptions and conclusions could just as well 
be the mandate of both the scientist and the philosopher of science. It is clear that there is 
something about the knowledge process generally—as well as specifically knowledge about 
nature—that is of interest to the environmental political theorist. Perhaps we might instead 
conceive of the goals and conclusions of environmental activists as one of many feminist 
standpoints—not to be dispatched to the realm of ideological commitment, but to be one place 
from which we can engage in the processes of translation. Translation that is “always 
interpretive, critical, and partial”—“a ground for conversation, rationality, and objectivity, which 
is power-sensitive, not ‘pluralist.’”53 Translation that is also the work of the theorist.  
 Though I engage less explicitly with environmental political theorists in the following 
two chapters, I offer each as an example of the kind of work that takes up the call that I read 
Wolin and Haraway as sounding. In each, I track the ways that various methodological and 
epistemic criteria (norms and concepts of science) attach to, foreground, or cloak a variety of 
ethical/political formations which, on one hand seek to preserve the status quo, and on the other, 
fail to adequately challenge it. 
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Chapter 2 
Doomsayers & Cornucopians: Calvin Beisner, Evangelical Environmentalism, and 
Epistemologies of Ignorance 
 
 In 1993, the newly established Evangelical Environmental Network published the 
“Evangelical Declaration of the Care of Creation,” explicitly advocating a response to climate 
change grounded in an evangelical obligation to care for the environment as part of God’s 
creation. Seven years later, a conservative organization called the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance 
offered a counter declaration for environmental stewardship, arguing that the God-given right of 
dominion over the earth is best secured through free markets. By the late-2000s, Richard Cizik 
(former President of the National Association of Evangelicals and a climate activist) had 
resigned from his post amid pressure from right-leaning Christian leaders; evangelical Senator 
Lindsay Graham had reversed his call for bipartisan climate action in the Senate claiming he was 
no longer persuaded by the science, and Pat Robertson (a prominent right-leaning evangelical 
leader, whose support for action against global warming was considered by the media to be high-
profile) had withdrawn his support for climate action, declaring climate change a hoax.1 While 
an evangelical environmentalist movement persists, white evangelicals in the United States are 
more likely to doubt that global climate change is caused by human activities, to believe that 
there is broad disagreement among scientists on this issue, and to generally distrust scientists 
than any other demographic in the United States.2 
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This chapter examines whether ignorance about science is an adequate explanation for 
evangelical contestations over environmentalism and climate science. It asks, what are the 
epistemic practices deployed by these community leaders? What can we learn about knowledge 
and ignorance from examining the modes through which doubt, disagreement, and distrust 
operate in this context? And in particular, what do these modes tell us about the role that 
knowledge practices play in establishing membership in groups? This conservative backlash 
against evangelical environmentalism—while claiming stewardship of the earth as its own stated 
goal—takes a decidedly neoliberal bent at the same time as it encourages skepticism of climate 
science. The loudest and most powerful voices of this contingent share several features: venues, 
tactics, and constituencies with the scientists who traffic in doubt,3 are the most conservative 
political representatives who regularly appear alongside the pundits of Fox News and Breitbart, 
and have partnerships with the researchers at conservative think tanks like the Heritage 
Foundation and the Cato Institute. The Cornwall Alliance, one of the key players spurring the 
retrenchment of evangelical environmentalism, defines its own mission as the combined 
promotion of biblical earth stewardship and economic development of the world’s poor. This 
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chapter seeks to understand how neoliberalism and evangelicalism come together in the service 
of knowledge claims that challenge and resist scientific consensus.  
  Making sense – to use the phrase somewhat playfully – of knowledge is difficult to do in 
this situation. There are competing kinds of knowledge being deliberated, as well as different 
grounds for truth claims and justificatory practices to consider—scientific knowledge, political 
knowledge, economic knowledge, and theological knowledge are but a few variations one 
encounters. And, it is additionally difficult to trace the relationship between these kinds of 
knowledge and individual knowers. Are the majority white evangelicals who are skeptical of the 
science of climate change simply lacking knowledge in scientific literacy? Willfully refusing? 
Something else altogether? As we saw in the previous chapter, the argument that the political 
deadlock on an adequate response to the threat of climate change can be explained by ignorance 
about the science is made in environmental political thought both implicitly (through the 
demonstration of how a clarification of the science can help us to refine our political responses), 
and explicitly, as in the case of Dale Jamieson’s book.4  In this chapter, I argue that 
epistemologies of ignorance offer crucial tools to refine this argument. To understand the active 
production of ignorance as a feature of group subjectivity and self-construction (but not 
necessarily as an articulated position consciously shared by each member of the community) 
explains the retrenchment of the evangelical environmentalist movement not as a function of 
individual ignorance conceived of as lack of scientific literacy, but helps to contextualize it in 
evangelicalism’s affiliations with neoliberalism, and is therefore instructive for political projects 
that seek to dismantle this knowledge/ignorance regime. At the same time, I also argue that 
ignorance about climate change is distinctive, and differs from other forms of group-based 
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ignorance, such as western ignorance about colonialism or white ignorance about racial 
oppression.5   
My analysis of this conservative evangelical “environmentalism”—the backlash to the 
original environmentalist push—and its epistemic practices proceeds through a close reading of 
the work of Calvin Beisner, in part because Beisner sits at the nexus of evangelical leadership, 
conservative think tanks, and conservative media outlets. Beisner, once a professor of social 
ethics at Knox Theological Seminary, had a hand in forming the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance, 
and in its subsequent transformation into the Cornwall Alliance, which to this day acts as a 
research-producing coordination hub between economic conservatives, climate change skeptics, 
and evangelicals. Beisner is the designated public face of this conservative evangelical effort, 
serves as its spokesperson on various radio programs, and is a prolific writer, his website 
boasting 12 books written, 30 edited, and 35 contributed to, in addition to “thousands” of both 
popular and scholarly articles published.6 He was hailed as “the leading evangelical climate-
change skeptic” in a 2006 issue of Baptists Today,7 has written several books specifically on 
environmentalism and economics,8 and designed the Cornwall Alliance’s 12-part DVD series 
“Resisting the Green Dragon” in addition to delivering two of its lectures.9 The Cornwall 
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9 Calvin Beisner, “Resisting the Green Dragon,” Filmed 2010, 
https://www.resistingthegreendragon.com/. 
 47 
Alliance blog currently features new posts from Beisner every week on topics from biodiversity 
to natural disasters, and he has sponsored and signed numerous petitions and declarations hosted 
on the site, including ones entitled “Forget ‘climate change’, energy empowers the poor!” and “A 
call to protect the unborn and the pro-life movement from environmentalist deceit: a declaration 
by concerned pro-lifers.” In 2014, the Heritage Foundation awarded him the “Outstanding 
Spokesperson on Faith, Science, and Stewardship” award at their 9th International Climate 
Change Conference. Beisner is a particularly salient figure for the deftness with which he folds 
claims about knowledge and science into claims about what it means to be evangelical, such that 
untangling them becomes quite complicated. His partnerships, visibility, and authority in the 
community (both self-proclaimed and asserted by others) allow me to trace what is at stake from 
the evangelical perspective. Following a designation suggested by sociologist Lydia Bean, we 
might think of Beisner as a “general” of the conservative-evangelical culture war.10 Though 
Evangelicals certainly hold a wide range of views regarding climate change, cues from in-group 
elites undoubtedly have ways of working themselves into local sermons and congregations, as 
evidenced by the rate at which evangelicals are more likely than the general American 
population to believe that there is no scientific consensus on climate change.11 Part of 
understanding how the positions that these generals hand down to their local-level captains and 
opinion-leaders work themselves into groups’ political positions (e.g. skepticism about a 
scientific consensus on climate change, or doubt regarding the necessity of a political response to 
it) involves examining the way that these positions are crafted both as and against knowledge. I 
argue that the success of Beisner’s political strategy lies in both his entwined dynamic of 
                                               
10 Lydia Bean, The Politics of Evangelical Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
11 PRRI/AAR Survey, “Religion, Values, and Climate Change.” 
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appropriating and imitating science, while simultaneously rejecting it, as well as his careful 
casting of the problem as in the end not about the environment at all, but rather about how much 
ground evangelicalism can afford to cede to systems of secular governance.  
 This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section develops an account of this version 
of the conservative evangelical “social imaginary,” building primarily from the work of political 
theorist William Connolly and philosopher Lorraine Code. This social imaginary—constituted 
by the joining together of right-wing Christianity and capitalism—forms a rich intellectual 
tradition of which Beisner is an active participant, and serves as the backdrop for the reading 
offered here of his environmental thought and epistemic practice. The second section turns to 
scholarship in philosophy on the epistemology of ignorance—tracing various accounts of the 
ways in which white supremacy, colonialism, and patriarchy have produced ignorance (or de-
valued knowledge) about such topics as non-white people and cultures, indigenous knowledges 
about nature and language, and non-male bodies and experience. Drawing from these accounts, 
the section proposes a set of criteria for understanding skepticism about climate change as 
dynamically entangled with the construction of white evangelical group identity and belonging. 
The third section turns to a close reading of Calvin Beisner’s rebuttals against both the 
evangelical environmentalist movements in the 90s, as well as his continued refusal of a more 
secular, political environmentalism. I argue that he makes three moves that are epistemically 
relevant: his continual insistence that a rational debate must proceed from evidence; the coupling 
of market language with biblical exegesis; and the construction of a group identity rooted in a 
commitment to an evangelical truth and worldview, and action in the world that proceeds from 
both. Taken together, these moves ground a sense of belonging in an evangelical community—
one which requires skepticism of a certain realm of scientific knowledge at the same time that it 
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claims to celebrate some of science’s epistemic criteria, while also entangling this skepticism 
with a belief in the principles of the “free” market. The chapter concludes by arguing that to 
position white evangelicalism as merely anti-intellectual and against science does not capture the 
dynamic ways that knowledge is being produced and deployed in this context. Nor does it 
capture all of the work that images of good science do in sustaining the metaphors and 
assumptions that infuse climate change denial as a political orientation in our current context. 
Part of the bind that Beisner spins for his readers hinges precisely on obscuring that which he 
ostensibly sets out to explain. He uses scientific language to cast climate science as 
environmentalism, and environmentalism as not science at all, but as a religion in its own right—
one that poses a great threat to the evangelist mission.  
 
Cowboy Capitalism and Right-wing Evangelicalism’s Social Imaginary 
To understand white evangelical climate change denial as an epistemic practice, it is crucial to 
examine what William Connolly has called the “capitalist-evangelical resonance machine.”12 
Calvin Beisner should be understood as a participant in the resonance machine, and 
epistemologies of ignorance in turn offer an account of how this machine works. His arguments 
about knowledge gain traction when they resonate with the images, metaphors, and affects that 
the machine assembles for the collective.  
 For Connolly, the resonances between the right edge of Christianity and capitalism 
become visible when you track the affects and intensities of both contemporary evangelical 
formations, and what he calls today’s “cowboy capitalism”—or in other words, when you track 
                                               
12 William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
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the affects and intensities between evangelical teachings and practices, and a belief in 
unregulated markets. He writes, 
the partners to the resonance machine in question have an existential orientation 
that encourages them to transfigure interest into greed, greed into anti-market 
ideology, anti-market ideology into market manipulation, market manipulation 
into state institutionalization of these operations, and the entire complex into 
policies to pull the security net away from ordinary workers, consumers, and 
retirees—some of whom are then set up to translate new intensities of resentment 
and cynicism into participation in the machine. Above all, individual and group 
bearers of this spirituality encourage each other to forge alliances with those in 
other walks of life who have the same spiritual affinities.13  
 
Connolly’s account here meets one of the challenges to the study of neoliberalism head-on. 
Where some scholars have argued that the designation of neoliberalism has come to refer to too 
many positions, arrangements, and practices that are in some ways contradicting, for Connolly 
these contradictions are part of this process.14 As we shall see, Calvin Beisner serves as an 
excellent example of this dynamic. His insistence that centralized state planning to address 
environmental concerns threatens the poor, and subsequent argument that a “truly free” market is 
required instead, allows him to embrace such policies as tax exemptions for the rich and state 
deregulation, while opposing social welfare programs, abortion, and federal funding for AIDS 
research.15 
On Connolly’s view, one of the key mechanisms that drives this resonance machine on 
the evangelical side is the role that community leadership plays in times of economic crisis or 
uncertainty. He argues that the calling to evangelize often reverberates with the capitalist affect 
of entitlement—a feature of the transfiguration of interest into greed. Times of economic 
                                               
13 Ibid, 43.  
14 Kean Birch, “What Exactly is Neoliberalism?” The Conversation, November 2, 2017. 
15 Calvin Beisner, “Is There an Invisible Hand to Help the Poor?” Church and Welfare 
Conference, 1992; Calvin Beisner, “AIDS and Rationality,” Cornwall Alliance, 1990.  
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hardship or crisis create the political conditions for community leaders to rally their 
congregations around economic policy as a form of group preservation against persecution. 
Connolly reads this affect as drawing on not a belief in the market itself, but in the economic 
ideals espoused by the market and its promises, combined with the conviction by many 
evangelists that entrepreneurial activity is the one worldly activity endowed with divine 
providence.16 The ideal of individualism in particular plays an active role in the American 
context.  
 The affective resonances between Christianity and capitalism congeal most vividly on the 
right, in Connolly’s view, through a particular reading of Revelation and the second coming that 
reverberates with anger, will to revenge, and the externalization of anxiety over one’s faith. He 
predicts that the pressures to engage in this externalization, defining one’s adversaries as 
“wanton sinners,” will escalate as more believers discover that Christianity is very much a 
minority religion on the globe. “Self-doubt and uncertainty are transfigured into an implacable 
drive to revenge against those who deny that Christ is the son of God,” while at the same time, 
insistence on the divine providence of entrepreneurial activity allows proponents to disparage 
welfare programs and “collective efforts to curtail global warming.”17 Importantly for Connolly, 
these affects are not necessarily determinative, rather, they explain the affinities between these 
positions by examining the intensity of the spiritualities that compose it. When these affects are 
captured in hegemonic evangelical narratives, and taken up with intensity, we can expect the 
resonances with cowboy capitalism to endure.  
                                               
16 Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 47, 32.  
17 Ibid, 48.  
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 Epistemologies of ignorance, then, are crucial for understanding how this resonance 
machine produces a skeptical orientation toward the anthropogenic climate change thesis 
(produces ignorance about climate change). They help us to see how these resonances between 
Christianity and capitalism in turn resonate with knowledge about nature, and they help us to 
think through resonances with more hegemonic forms of ignorance insulated by epistemologies 
of mastery and possession—namely, white ignorance of racial oppression, settler ignorance of 
indigenous history and knowledge, and male ignorance of female bodies, experiences, and 
knowledges. In this sense, epistemologies of ignorance enrich Connolly’s resonance machine by 
examining how these resonances get taken up by individuals through their group membership 
and are in turn translated into policy orientations.  
I argue that the relationship between Connolly’s machine and epistemologies of 
ignorance should further be understood in relation to two concepts that arise from Lorraine 
Code’s work: “epistemology of mastery” and “social imaginary.”18 To read the resonance 
machine as its own social imaginary, that both draws on and resists the epistemology of mastery, 
lays the groundwork for exploring epistemologies of ignorance in this context. In her book 
Ecological Thinking: the Politics of Epistemic Location, philosopher Lorraine Code argues for 
an ecological approach to knowledge that resists and contests the “dominant epistemologies of 
post-Industrial Revolution affluent societies [that] are (often tacitly) complicit in perpetuating the 
rhetoric of mastery and possession: knowledge acquired for manipulation, prediction, and control 
over nature and human nature; knowledge as a prized commodity legitimating its possessors’ 
authoritative occupancy (and sometime abuse) of positions of power and recasting ‘the natural 
                                               
18 Lorraine Code, Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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world’ as a resource for human gratification.”19 Epistemologies of mastery and possession 
authorized slavery, colonialism, the seizure of indigenous lands, modern sovereignty, and 
environmental degradation and extraction, all of which have been central to the positivism that 
establishes an objective and detached science as the ultimate authority in knowledge production 
and evaluation. As I will show, though the evangelical rebuttal against environmentalism wields 
the epistemology of mastery somewhat differently than white supremacy (although we should 
also ask if and where this particular evangelical formation and white supremacy are entangled 
with one another)—it does rely on its progressive economic narrative, while simultaneously 
troubling its hierarchy of knowledge regimes. In this sense, it might appear to engage in 
epistemic practices that are particular and that resist the universalizing pull of enlightenment 
humanism. And yet, in its attempt to seek out evangelical knowledge about human nature and 
nature generally, it reifies a vision of the human that perfectly resonates with the subject required 
and produced by neoliberal economics.  Neoliberalism, in this sense, does not only combine with 
a certain interpretation of the evangelist doctrine to constitute this political constellation, as 
Connolly argues—it also lends evangelicalism a potency in its specific conflicts with scientific 
knowledge and practice.  
 What does it mean to locate a social imaginary of American evangelical climate 
denialism? Like Code, I am interested in a social imaginary that sustains “hegemonic practices of 
mastery” (e.g. extraction and degradation), with a web of “assumptions and tacit agreements” 
belonging to everyone and no one, about how best to know nature, human nature, and their 
interrelations.20 For Code, this social imaginary is in part productive of a relationship to science 
                                               
19 Ibid, 35. 
20 Ibid, 29. 
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and scientific knowledge, but it also produces meaning, images, metaphors, operative idea(l)s 
and interlocking “explanations-expectations” that are constitutive of patterns of legitimacy, 
credibility, and their opposites. These “often-implicit” systems and patterns are the mechanisms 
with which people and groups, in particular times and places, “enact their knowledge and 
subjectivities and craft their self-understandings.”21 As importantly, a social imaginary “is never 
seamless or static in a nontotalitarian society: it is always in motion, whether in maintaining 
itself or in critical interrogation within and around it.”22 A social imaginary is a hegemonic 
narrative that assembles and organizes images, metaphors, and meanings for the collective that is 
established by and through that narrative, even if these cues are not collectively deliberated on, 
or even necessarily universally shared. The social imaginary that infuses and sustains the ethos 
and habitus of climate change denial in evangelicalism, then, is best thought of not as an 
articulated political position held by each individual member of the group, but as a feature of the 
resonance machine. In this case, both the cognitive and affective dimensions of this social 
landscape are crucial for understanding Calvin Beisner’s project as more dynamic than simply a 
campaign of misinformation.  
Consider the theorizations of ignorance contained in the volume Race and 
Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana. Ignorance is 
conceived variously as a historical feature of white supremacy, produced socially through 
processes of perception, conception, memory, testimony, and motivational group interest;23 as a 
                                               
21 Ibid, 29. 
22 Ibid, 33; she continues, “Its gaps, its motility open up spaces for the work of the instituting 
imaginary” or, in other words, for the disruption of the hegemonic imaginary, and its potential 
destabilization by a reimagining as a vehicle for radical social critique. 
23 Charles Mills, “White Ignorance,” In Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by 
Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, 11-38 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). 
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substantive epistemic practice that is structural and linked to social privilege and oppression;24 as 
“wielded strategically by groups living under oppression as a way of gaining information, 
sabotaging work, avoiding or delaying harm, and preserving a sense of self;”25 as something that 
is managed and preserved by sometimes “grotesquely prodigious effort;”26 and as an ecology 
sustained by and sustaining the sexual, racial, expropriation, slavery, and colonial contracts.27 It 
is sometimes referred to as a strategy of anti-elitism, as willful, or as conscious and self-
congratulatory.  
 How can we situate evangelical ignorance about climate change alongside these 
accounts? Is it simply a strategic political position that wields the armor of anti-intellectualism 
for the pursuit of goals that serve the individual interests of powerful evangelical elite?28 Is it 
rooted in and sustained by the colonial contracts that authorize epistemologies of mastery and 
possession? Is it a strategic way to preserve an evangelical sense of self? Part of the difficulty 
that lies in this situating is that evangelical communities are not a cohesive, coherent 
demographic group. But then again, neither are women, black folks, and indigenous peoples. In 
this sense, evangelical ignorance of climate change is at once, and partially, all of these things. 
The reading I offer here is of one particular right-wing evangelical social imaginary—that in 
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addition to resonating with a capitalist ethos, resonates with ignorance of both the oppressed and 
the oppressor—one in which climate scientists and their advocates at the policy level pose a 
threat to evangelicalism itself. The stakes then are not about climate change or the environment 
at all, but about how much more ground evangelicalism can afford to cede to a secular 
government that has already taken over so much of the social domain of the church, where 
institutionalized social services have encroached on the church provision of both charity and 
community.29 In this sense, climate change denial powerfully taps into a long history of the 
Christian right’s struggle against secularization and fraught relationship with the American state. 
 
Epistemologies of Ignorance 
The philosophical study of ignorance (or agnotology) is an important recent development in the 
study of knowledge that has its origins in the social justice oriented projects of feminism and 
critical race theory. The questions that animate this area of study include: How should we 
understand ignorance? How is it produced and maintained? What role does ignorance play in our 
lives generally, and particularly in the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies? The 
landscape of central themes, insights, and tensions among the varying answers to these questions 
serve as my groundwork for reading Beisner’s work as an epistemic project. Of particular 
importance are the ways in which ignorance has been typologized, and the analyses of the role 
that different forms of ignorance play in structuring relations between and among groups. I read 
Beisner as relying on the understanding of ignorance as native state, in order to cultivate 
ignorance of the other two types.  
                                               
29 Lydia Bean, The Politics of Evangelical Identity. 
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 Robert Proctor, in the introduction to the collection Agnotology: The Making & 
Unmaking of Ignorance, suggests that part of the project of exploring ignorance as “more than 
the not yet known” involves making distinctions between types of ignorance.30 He proposes three 
possible distinctions as a starting point—ignorance as “native state”; ignorance as “lost realm”; 
and ignorance as a “strategic ploy.” This typology distinguishes between both sources of 
ignorance—where does it come from—as well as between ways about which ignorance has been 
discussed and queried. I argue that though Calvin Beisner draws on an understanding of 
ignorance as native state in order to justify a position that is often characterized as a strategic 
ploy (climate change denial), his own realignment of Christianity with real science, and of 
environmentalism with religion, plays on the image of ignorance as lost realm and is where much 
of the complex epistemic work is being done.  
For Proctor, explanations of ignorance as native state are largely attributable to scientists, 
to scientific approaches to knowledge, and to modernity. Ignorance here is the “not yet known,” 
and that “not yet” is the driver of knowledge production and, to a certain extent, of history. 
Ignorance is a resource—a flag to denote questions for study—and at the same time a hurdle 
which must be overcome. Ignorance is absence and void, knowledge the thing that fills it. 
Modernity breathes enlightenment language into this characterization. “Light floods the 
darkness, keys are found to unlock locks, ignorance is washed away, teaching uplifts out of 
ignorance, which is thereby destroyed or chased, and so forth.”31 If ignorance is the “not yet” 
then so are the ignorant—those without knowledge are conceptualized as children or as 
                                               
30 Robert N. Proctor and Linda Schiebinger, eds., Agnotology: The Making & Unmaking of 
Ignorance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
31 Robert N. Proctor, “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of 
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primitive, and the progressive march of history aims at remediating this state, though only up to a 
point. One of the features of ignorance in this modern sense is that it is regenerative. As Proctor 
notes, for every question answered, two more arise. The whole enterprise of science (and thus of 
progress) is sustained by the ineradicable existence of ignorance conceived as either lack of 
knowledge, or the not yet known.32  As we shall see, the ignorance-as-lack view of science is one 
that, perhaps paradoxically, infuses all of Beisner’s engagements with environmentalists and 
climate science. 
These metaphors, and the corollary political and scientific projects to remediate 
ignorance as native state, are the stuff of Code’s epistemology of mastery. This is the view of 
ignorance that authorized colonialism as a project of progress (savages haven’t yet embraced 
scientific knowledge as the harbinger of civilization), that continues to authorize extraction as a 
project of progress (nature is a passive object of knowledge and available to be mined as a 
resource), and that breathes life into doctrines of individualism (ignorance as a yardstick against 
which to evaluate individual lives and possibilities). Yet while this view is problematized within 
scholarship on ignorance, it also provides a useful heuristic for thinking about the distribution of 
epistemic resources. Insofar as there are forms of ignorance that are correctable, the kinds of 
questions we ought to pose pertain to who has been denied access to what epistemic resources, 
and why. Put differently, if we are conceptualizing ignorance as a lack of knowledge, we should 
                                               
32Thomas Kuhn can be thought of as engaging these questions in his study of the history of 
scientific discovery: “Is it not possible, or perhaps even likely, that contemporary scientists know 
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Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 290.  
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ask who does not know what and why, and these answers in turn provide cues for a more robust, 
structural account of the mechanisms of ignorance. 
The questions that arise from conceiving of ignorance as native state anticipate the view 
of ignorance as “lost realm.” Similar to the regenerative feature of ignorance as “lost realm,” 
ignorance can also be a feature of “selectivity,”33 both scientific and otherwise. Which questions 
get addressed at any given historical moment, or in any given space, inevitably leave some things 
unasked or unaccounted for. Selection is important on different levels – it plays out visually, 
affecting what is seen as an important question to ask, or as an interesting phenomenon to 
explain; and it also plays out in the interpretive context, both in the framing of the question, and 
in the selection of method for approaching it. The unasked questions are part of this “lost realm” 
of knowledge, but there are also kinds of knowledge that have actually been lost over time. 
Proctor (along with others34) argues that colonialism plays a hugely important role in the 
historical production of ignorance. The preference for Enlightenment-based scientific approaches 
to knowledge led colonizers to dismiss indigenous forms of knowledge, about agriculture or 
women’s health and reproduction for example, as folk-knowledge and these knowledges in turn 
all but disappear from the annals of history. Beisner’s sharp criticism of post-normal science 
should be understood as cultivating precisely this form of ignorance—rendering certain 
questions and techniques for answering them outside the purview of scientific (or theological) 
                                               
33 Proctor, “Agnotology,” 8.  
34 see Adrienne Mayor, “Suppression of Indigenous Fossil Knowledge: From Claverack, New 
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Schiebinger, 183-208. 
 60 
knowledge production, and therefore ineligible for public deliberation as such.35 The criteria for 
good scientific practice to which he latches (infused with the enlightenment imagery) allow him 
to eject much of mainstream climate science into this lost realm as either not knowledge, but 
something else (sometimes politics, sometimes sacrilegious fanaticism), or as simply not-
knowable at all.  
 Ignorance as strategic ploy/active construct is perhaps most familiar in the case of debate 
about climate change—there is ample debate about the extent to which the manipulation, 
interpretation, and presentation of scientific data all impact public engagement with scientific 
knowledge.36 But Proctor notes that this is not just a matter of having a structure of knowledge 
on one hand, and individuals’ interactions with it in the other. It is often rather a matter of a 
context obscuring access to certain “historical contingencies.”37 Proctor devotes significant time 
to some very specific examples of the kind of manufactured ignorance that we might normally 
associate with climate change denial—the tobacco industry, and military classification being the 
two most common. In the case of the tobacco industry, the campaign to cast doubt on the 
scientific consensus that smoking cigarettes is harmful to people’s health is well documented. 
                                               
35 Calvin Beisner, “Wanted for Premeditated Murder: How Post-Normal Science Stabbed Real 
Science in the Back on the Way to the Illusion of ‘Scientific Consensus’ on Global Warming,” 
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Tobacco companies hired their own scientists to engage in a two-prong approach to 
manufacturing ignorance about cigarettes’ effects. The first was to publish work that was critical 
of the methods and conclusions of the studies that linked cigarette smoke to specific health 
problems, and the second was to produce their own studies that demonstrated significantly less 
cause for alarm, if they demonstrated anything at all. This form of ignorance is generally thought 
of as having politically motivated intentionality behind it, but might also be thought of as 
encompassing other kinds of latent or unarticulated willful ignorance. 
Following Proctor’s typology, various questions arise regarding how these types of 
ignorance work together or inform one another. The examples that motivate the study of race and 
ignorance, for example, reverberate differently within each of the three conceptualizations that 
Proctor offers. To explain white racism and ignorance about white supremacy as a feature of 
individual “knowledge not yet acquired” and to interrogate in what that knowledge consists, 
recourse to each of the other two concepts is necessary. To ask what is it that is “not yet known” 
in the case of individually held racist beliefs is to miss the vested interest white people as a group 
have in continuing to “not know” about their own privilege—or in other words, in remaining 
ignorant.38 To think about the persistence of white supremacy as a feature of an ignorance regime 
requires conceptualizing it as having a geography and a vibrancy of its own. I argue that climate 
change denial in the context of conservative, white evangelicalism similarly reverberates in all 
three registers. To pose the question as one of individual knowers’ lack of knowledge misses the 
extent to which vested group interests have been bound up with/produced through the capitalist-
evangelical resonance machine.  
                                               
38 Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Managing Ignorance”; Charles Mills, “White Ignorance.”   
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 Using this landscape of ignorance to think through the backlash against evangelical 
environmentalism, I argue, allows us to read Calvin Beisner in at least three different ways. First, 
it allows us to analyze the ways in which he invokes the requirements for good scientific 
knowledge—and with that the enlightenment image of ignorance as the not yet known—in order 
to encourage a focus on a different set of problems and questions. Second, it allows us to see the 
ways in which he folds neoliberal market language into his biblical exegesis—which I take to be 
a core strategy for his demarcation of knowledge from “something else” and of the knowable 
against what cannot be known. And finally, it allows us to examine his invocation of belonging, 
in what that belonging consists, and that which threatens it. Working together, these three aspects 
of his work articulate a social imaginary where the criteria for good science according to an 
orthodox scientific epistemology foreground a cowboy capitalist evangelical refusal of or 
response to an environmentalism that threatens the existence of evangelicals as a community of 
knowers. 
 
Calvin Beisner’s Crusade Against Evangelical Environmentalism 
In 2010, Calvin Beisner participated in a panel presentation at the International Climate Science 
Coalition Fourth International Conference on Climate Change. His talk was entitled, “Climate 
Policy: Theological, Scientific, and Economic Considerations,” and it opened with the following 
polemic: “The world is in the grip of an idea: that burning fossil fuels to provide cheap, abundant 
energy is causing global warming that will be so dangerous that we must stop it by reducing our 
use of fossil fuels, no matter the cost.”39 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the 
conference was organized by the Heartland Institute and funded in part by donations from 
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ExxonMobil, Koch family foundations, and Scaife family foundations,40 the setup for this talk 
(and for the conference as a whole) is emblematic of the epistemic terrain at stake in Beisner’s 
nearly 30-year promotion of evangelical stewardship of the earth as climate change 
denial/skepticism.41 Revealingly, the entire project operates under the guise of good scientific 
practice, while at the same time reconfiguring the terms of discourse into those of the resonance 
machine. 
 
Evidence and Rational Debate  
In his 1997 book Where Garden Meets Wilderness, perhaps his most thorough engagement with 
the early evangelical environmentalists, Beisner articulates two prongs of the epistemic quandary 
facing evangelicals on questions of the environment and stewardship. The book is an attempt to 
think through on one hand, what we know, and on the other, what we should do given what we 
know (the relevant “we” of course being evangelicals). The pursuit of knowledge is 
foregrounded as the central concern. The various chapters are littered with subheadings such as: 
“How Should We Perceive Our World?;”42 “Does the Bible Really Say This?;”43 and “Five More 
Fallacious Types of Argument.”44  The bibliography boasts hundreds of sources, spanning 
                                               
40 Brendan DeMille, “Denial-a-palooza Round 4: ‘International Conference on Climate Change’ 
Groups Funded by Exxon, Koch Industries,” Desmog, May 13, 2010, 
https://www.desmogblog.com/denial-a-palooza-4th-international-conference-climate-change-
heartland.  
41 The theme of the conference was “Reconsidering the Science and Economics,” 
https://www.heartland.org/multimedia/podcasts/the-sun-dictates-the-climate.  
42 Calvin Beisner, Where Garden Meets Wilderness: Evangelical Entry into the Environmental 
Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 11.  
43 Ibid, 53.  
44 Ibid, 85.  
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scientific works, economic treatises, news media, biblical texts, and materials produced by 
environmental organizations.  
But the inverse of those concerns also haunts the book—where Beisner claims to be 
getting to the bottom of what we really know, it turns out that the most important thing all the 
way down is what we do not know. So though the book purports to be clearing the ground for 
knowledge about the environment, and a corresponding set of prescriptions for how evangelicals 
should then respond to this knowledge, it is in fact better thought of as a book collecting all the 
claims we should doubt are true and as a rulebook on what actions not to take. Beisner performs  
“good science” in order to answer two questions: 1) what does the bible tell us about 
environmental stewardship (and the sometimes explicit/sometimes implicit sub-question what 
does the bible tell us about climate change?)?; and 2) what other evidence can we look to where 
the bible does not provide answers? He subsequently takes a two-prong approach to defining his 
own take on evangelical environmentalism. It first allows him to engage in a friendly sort-of peer 
review of the different biblical justifications for action to combat climate change, while laying 
the groundwork for the claim that the bible cannot give us all we need given the current political 
(especially political for evangelicals) stakes. And it then allows him to clear up some common 
“misconceptions” that environmentalists have regarding the scientific evidence. Though Beisner 
never says that climate change is not real, it is hard to grasp anything that can be concretely 
known by the reader in the end. The pervasive treatment of the not yet known, or the not possible 
to know, makes the whole book read like an exercise in unlearning, unmaking, and unraveling. 
He deploys images of ignorance as lack of knowledge, while subtly (or not so subtly) cultivating 
ignorance borne of both selectivity and strategic construct.  
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 At the close of chapter six, entitled “Observations of the Mind of the Evangelical 
Environmental Movement,” Beisner makes the following claim:  
The quality of the environmental debate among evangelicals can improve if all 
sides will commit to logic and evidence rather than misrepresentations, moral 
condemnations, ad hominem arguments, intimidation, appeals to majorities, and 
unbalanced emphasis of either the negative or the positive aspects of phenomena. 
It is my hope that this book—regardless whether it persuades any of my brothers 
and sisters in the evangelical environmental movement of any of the positions I 
take on the theological, ethical, biblical, and empirical issues discussed—will at 
least help to elevate the debate.45 
 
This is a rhetorical approach Beisner deploys throughout the book: detail the “controversy;” 
remind the reader of the importance of clarity, logic, and evidence; provide, or flag, the “missing 
evidence”; and finally offer a different perspective on the controversy for the stated purpose of 
moving knowledge forward, which in effect requires slowing down and taking caution in action 
(or not acting at all). In the fifth chapter, for example, he engages in this mode of “scientific” 
argumentation (a purportedly unbiased review of the available evidence) in order to explore what 
he calls “the problem of environmental misinformation.”46   
 This chapter is particularly interesting for the way that it characterizes the cause and 
source of what Beisner highlights as “misinformation.” It is not just that environmentalists have 
misinterpreted the evidence, but they have also intentionally misrepresented it in order to 
frighten people into a “crisis mentality.” He details the goal of the chapter as to “examine some 
examples of empirical errors and scare tactics both to offer readers another view of the alleged 
problems and to suggest points at which evangelical environmentalists need to be more careful 
about empirical claims.”47 The empirical claims and the interpretation of the consequences of 
                                               
45 Ibid, 93.  
46 Ibid, 59. 
47 Ibid, 59. 
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these empirical claims are tied tightly together in Beisner’s analysis. It is not simply empirically 
incorrect that Americans have consumed more of the world’s resources since 1945 than all 
previous generations together—he also argues that environmentalists draw moral conclusions 
from the misinterpretation of this data that are logically irrelevant to it.48  
 How should we make sense of Beisner’s continued insistence on the importance of both 
the unknown and of lack of bias for the proper evaluation of evidence? This is the aspect of his 
work that draws most heavily on the enlightenment images and metaphors for good scientific 
practice and knowledge. An orthodox scientific epistemology is concerned with discerning the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge-making, producing universally valid 
principles, replicability and experimentation, reliable observations, knowers as value-free, and 
theory as (politically and socially) neutral.49 These images infuse Beisner’s engagement with 
environmentalists at the same time that he insists on the importance of cultivating a specifically 
evangelical sensibility for environmental questions and concerns. He obsesses over how to 
properly define the terms of measurement,50 over how to generate “truly representative” 
examples,51 and over predictions that fail to come true or to be truly explanatory.52 On the case 
of how to properly measure deforestation he writes: 
This is no small margin of error. It is not the sort of thing that, in scientific work, 
understandably arises from slight variations in method or measurement. Huge 
variations like this more often stem from lack of reliable empirical study as the 
basis for any numbers at all. These discrepancies, in other words, are not just 
insignificant oddities. They are symptomatic of a larger problem that afflicts a 
great deal of environmental science and propaganda: a scarcity of long-term, 
observational field data. All too often the missing field data are replaced by 
                                               
48 Ibid, 61.  
49 Lorraine Code, Ecological Thinking; Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Method in Ecology: 
Strategies for Conservation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
50 Calvin Beisner, Where Garden Meets Wilderness, 61.  
51 Ibid, 62, 65.  
52 Ibid, 63.  
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simple guesses that later get repeated as estimates, only to be repeated ever after 
as proven facts.53 
 
As Beisner would have the reader believe, environmentalists fail on the front of good scientific 
practice in two ways—they fail to collect appropriate data needed to meet the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for making knowledge claims, and they fail to interpret the data that they do 
have reliably, neutrally, and value-free.  
Note that my own claim here is not that Beisner is practicing good science, but rather that 
he borrows the concepts and norms of a classic scientific epistemology in order to encourage 
doubt about a set of scientifically based political movements and programs for action. This is 
important because it calls into question the idea of the authority of consensus at the same time as 
it reifies a neutral science as the only reliable one. Never mind that Beisner’s own engagement is 
anything but neutral. In fact, another crucial feature of Beisner’s evaluation of evidence, which 
highlights the potency of neoliberalism in the construction of this knowledge/ignorance regime, 
is its latent insistence that individualism serves as an important prerequisite for unbiased 
evaluation. Much of the force of Beisner’s argumentation relies on his positioning of himself as a 
free-thinker. The importance of freedom of thought is folded intricately into his biblical readings 
of labor and nature, as well as into his engagements with environmental science. In this sense, he 
knits the scientific and the biblical tightly together under the rubric of neoliberalism. The realm 
of thought and knowledge is like a market – we can only flourish in it when we are committed to 
freedom from regulation(/bias). This argument works only in the context of the resonance 
machine. Only within the machine can Beisner be at once an evangelist, a cowboy capitalist, and 
a scientist. 
                                               




Biblical Exegesis and the Neoliberal Imaginary  
Beisner’s efforts to dismantle the biblical justification for a stewardship of the earth that 
responds to anthropogenic climate change revolve around three central interpretive debates over 
the doctrine of dominion, the curse, and imago dei. The conclusions he draws about these 
interpretive concerns are less important than the preponderance of neoliberal imagery and 
language (and the repeated citations of economists Friedrich Hayek and Julian Simon) that 
sustains both his readings of others’ interpretations, as well as his own.54 Take his discussion of 
the doctrine of dominion as an example.  
Beisner argues that the Biblical teaching from Genesis 1:28 that God has given man 
dominion over the earth is the central Biblical truth that is misconstrued by both secular 
environmentalists and by evangelical ones, and which fails to generate knowledge useful for the 
evangelical community.55 He criticizes secular, feminist, deep ecology, and new age approaches 
to environmentalism for the blame they place on Christianity, and on the Bible itself, for the link 
between this teaching and historical environmental degradation. But he argues that evangelical 
environmentalists have failed to adequately counter this charge in their explications of the 
centrality of stewardship in biblical text. On his view, they have further confused the doctrine of 
dominion, rather than clarified it, by virtue of their failure to read dominion and stewardship as 
                                               
54 Beisner cites extensively from both Hayek’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in 
Economics from 1975 and from his book The Road to Serfdom. Included in these footnotes is a 
further discussion of both Hayek and Adam Smith’s separation of the rule of law from the rules 
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“good” invisible hand of the market (as ordained by god, thus divine), and the “bad” invisible 
hand of the welfare state; Calvin Beisner, “Is There an Invisible Hand to Help the Poor?” Church 
and Welfare Conference, 1992.  
55 Calvin Beisner, Where Garden Meets Wilderness, 12-14, 43-47.  
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“balancing truths.” This failure plays out in two specific ways. First, that evangelical 
environmentalists rely on a misreading of genesis 1:28 in conjunction with genesis 2:15 – where 
in 1:28 Adam “subdues” and “rules” the earth on behalf of God, and in 2:15 Adam is meant to 
“till” and “keep” the garden of Eden. Beisner claims that environmentalists incorrectly read “till” 
and “keep” as a specification of “subdue” and “rule,” and in doing so, they miss an important 
distinction between earth and Garden. Second, supposing that the command to till and keep does 
define or refine the command to subdue and rule, some environmentalists mistakenly emphasize 
the meaning of the word that translates into till or cultivate (abad) - into “serve.”56 Beisner 
argues that to emphasize servitude as the appropriate translation of till is to miss again the 
contrast between earth and garden in Genesis’s geography, and that while “indeed all of man’s 
tilling of the earth should be service to God, it is inaccurate to say that it is service to the Earth 
itself.” This mistaken interpretation—that keep and till, are a refinement of the mandate to 
subdue and rule—on Beisner’s view in fact lends itself to sacrilegious practices such as new age 
Gaia worship.  
Beisner instead translates the word for till differently, arguing that “when it is followed 
by the accusative of things, [it should be translated] as to labor, work, or do work, e.g. to till the 
ground, a vineyard, or garden.”57  He turns then to Richard Young’s exegesis of this translation 
as the one that has paid most attention to the balancing truths in Genesis: 
 The word translated “work” or “till” is the common Hebrew word for “serve.” 
The most common meanings are 1) to work, used especially when there is no 
object 2) to cultivate, when the object is ground, vineyard, or the like 3) to work 
for someone either as a servant or a slave and 4) to serve or worship a deity… 
Normally when ground is the object, the word means to till or cultivate, implying 
cultivation for one’s own sustenance. The context of Genesis 2:5 however 
suggests a different focus. God’s concern is not with people managing the garden 
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for their own sustenance, for they had not been created yet, but with the need for a 
manager to help keep order and harmony in creation. The service is rendered to 
God, not ourselves.58  
 
So Beisner takes this, in conjunction with the difference he develops elsewhere between Garden 
and earth – namely that the earth was good, but that the garden of Eden was specially good – to 
mean that dominion over earth is a mandate that involves transforming the rest of the earth, bit 
by bit, in the image of Eden’s glory. He claims, “the dominion mandate, properly understood, 
gives man legitimate authority to subdue and rule the earth, progressively conforming it to his 
needs and the glory of God.”59 He goes on to say “that people do and will rule the earth is 
unavoidable. How they rule is the crucial question.”60 The crucial task for Evangelical 
environmentalists, on this reading, is to insist as far as possible that humans rule consistently 
with the commandments of God’ law, rather than with secular humanist notions of right and 
wrong, or with the values of Eastern religion.  
Note the language of capitalism in the above discussion. Dominion should be understood 
according to a rubric of labor and management, progressively transforming the earth according to 
the divine example of the garden. For Beisner, dominion over the earth should not be understood 
as mastery unbounded, but rather as mastery according to the requirements for the cultivation of 
global wealth accumulation (Beisner often talks about global poverty amelioration, but it is not 
clear that he is committed to any kind of redistribution of wealth except that “naturally” occurs in 
“free” market contexts).61 In this sense, Beisner transforms the epistemology of mastery – the 
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61 In much of his recent commentary on climate change he makes comments such as: “Sad to 
say, despite Pope Francis’s best intentions, the policies he recommends to mitigate global 
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language of market fundamentalism allows him to articulate a specific understanding of the 
proper evangelical relationship to (cultivation of) non-human nature, while rendering the 
evangelical subject as the neutral, universal, and rational individual of enlightenment thinking. 
He joins reason to revelation. What evangelicals risk in their encounters with environmentalism 
then, is relinquishing dominion of the earth as granted by god. In a later discussion on 
biodiversity, he explicitly defines the principles of biblical stewardship as “a free market within 
the moral restraints of God’s law.”62 
Beisner’s attempts to explicate how Evangelicals ought to approach the doctrine of 
dominion is instructive in the types of evidence it legitimates for knowledge in the realm of 
decision-making. He argues that “one problem of the doctrine is that it simply doesn’t give 
direct, pat answers to most of the questions raised in environmental discussions.”63 He then goes 
on to ask, “should we drill for oil? Here? How? Should we mine coal? There? By boring (which 
is much more dangerous to the miners), or strip-mining (which can leave ugly scars on the land, 
although scars can be restored to beauty)? Should we log old-growth forests? Where? How 
much, if any, should we preserve?”64 He argues that evangelicals should not locate answers to 
these questions in scripture, because to even pose the questions in this way confuses the primary 
Biblical truth of human survival as the top priority. What we actually need he argues is 
“generations of thought and experience” (or, evidence) – but still filtered through the mandate of 
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dominion, and always prioritizing human life.65 He argues, for example, that there is a difference 
between giving up one’s life to save another human being and giving it up to save a hill, or 
forest, or whale (but also by the way, he claims, there is no reason why sensible hunting of 
whales need threaten their whole species). It is very telling that the only examples of the kinds of 
“environmental” questions that we need non-biblical evidence to solve are ones that pit 
economic development and industry against concern for non-human nature on its own terms.  
Neoliberalism as a political (and ethical) commitment to free markets infuses these 
discussions in two ways. Through the language of stewardship as managerialism and dominion, 
it grounds the evangelical knower in her biblical commitments, and it dictates the terms of the 
environmental discussion. In this sense, it is the capitalist part of the resonance machine that gets 
pitted against the (ideological) environmentalist—not the Christian against the scientist.  
 
Belonging to an Evangelical Community 
 Beisner’s appendix discussion on biodiversity in Where Garden Meets Wilderness is a 
striking example of the way his performance of good scientific practice and his realignment of 
revelation with reason work together to draw a boundary around the community that is at stake, 
while simultaneously obscuring that boundary as a demonstration of a broader ethical 
commitment. In this chapter, he engages deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and animal rights 
activists on both the scientific grounds for, as well as the ethical commitments to, advocacy for 
biodiversity. He details three primary qualifications of the view that maintaining biodiversity is a 
good end in general: 1) that there are some biologically diverse entities, such as viruses, that he 
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takes the extinction of which to be an acceptable reduction of biodiversity, which in turn is a 
defensible view only if one concedes that some hierarchizing of biological entities is necessary 
and acceptable;66 2) that there are “trade-offs” in maintaining biodiversity;67 and 3) it is 
impossible to avoid “opportunity costs” in species preservation.68 The last two qualifications 
center neoliberal commitments in the analysis blatantly in the economic language, but the way 
that the first qualification unfolds throughout the discussion is quite revealing. It turns out that 
though the Christian assumptions at play in developing “qualitative distinctions between life 
forms” place all humans at the top of the rung of ethical consideration, what is really at stake is 
the worldview that authorizes this particular hierarchy, as well as the decisions and calculations 
that need to be made for the consequent economic trade-offs and opportunity costs.69  
Beisner’s critiques of deep ecology, ecofeminism, and animal rights views subsequently 
revolve around what he takes to be mistaken alternate sets of assumptions that authorize different 
ethical hierarchies, combined again with a “critical” engagement of the scientific evidence. He 
claims, “the purpose of pointing to the lack of sound evidence regarding the rate of species 
extinction is not to belittle or ignore what might be a significant problem but to remind ourselves 
that sound policy must be based on sound information.”70 Note also his characterization of the 
feminist critique of science: “contemporary feminism rejects science outright—or redefines it—
because science operates in a manner not sufficiently sensitive to ‘feminine thought patterns’ 
because it is a fundamentally ‘masculine’ discipline.”71 And further his critique of Peter Singer 
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and other thinkers on animal rights: “this perspective trivializes racism by putting speciesism on 
the same level with it. If I were Black, I’d be worried about anyone who said speciesism was as 
bad as racism.”72 But Beisner is not black, and is he not also engaged in a version of redefining 
science or critiquing scientific practice in accordance with his own assumptions and worldview? 
What we see at work in this chapter is a recourse to the economistic, the calculative, and the 
instrumental for the setup of an ethical struggle that sets the stage for skepticism of a certain 
scientific conclusion. To be an evangelical (with a commitment to the worldview that authorizes 
a particular characterization of the important qualitative distinctions among life forms), and to 
act in an evangelical way (make the proper trade-offs and calculate the relevant opportunity 
costs) means to engage this particular body of knowledge with hesitation and doubt, lest risk the 
survival of the very worldview to begin with.  
Post-normal science poses a similar threat to the group in much of Beisner’s more recent 
writing and lecturing. Beisner argues that environmentalism ought to be thought of as a “religion 
in its own right,” competing with Christianity (in the United States as well as globally) as a well 
from which to draw ethical, social, and political considerations.73 For him, the criteria for good 
scientific practice are not bound up in the secular humanism of the enlightenment, but are rather 
outgrowths of Christian faith and doctrine.74 As such, part of the existential threat that the 
environmentalist worldview poses for the Christian worldview actually involves what he 
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characterizes as its refusal of science—its “flight from reason to mysticism.”75 Consider the 
following remarks: 
In other words, ‘post-normal science,’ shorn of the commitments of ‘normal 
science’ to transparency, disinterestedness, falsifiability, and skepticism, is the 
guise under which climate change and any other issue can become the vehicle for 
promoting predetermined social and political goals. The warfare between post-
normal science and real science is important not just in the debate over ‘climate 
change,’ but in all kinds of issues in which science interfaces with policy. Like the 
pseudo-Christian cults that borrow vocabulary from Christianity but redefine all 
the terms, post-normal science is simply the application of rhetoric borrowed from 
the sciences to policy debates, cloaking one particular policy preference with the 
authority of ‘science,’ and successful at doing so only to the extent that policy 
makers and the public are ignorant of the fact that post-normal science isn’t 
science at all.76 
 
Beisner here—in aligning post-normal science with pseudo-Christian cults (post-normal science 
distorts the criteria of science in the same way that pseudo-Christian cults distort Christian 
concepts), after having argued that transparency, disinterestedness, falsifiability, and skepticism 
should be understood as products of Christianity rather than secular humanism—in a sense 
redraws the terms of the debate at the same time as he shifts the stakes. If Christianity and the 
criteria for good scientific practice become analogous by virtue of the analogousness of that 
which distorts each, then it is no longer scientific knowledge that poses a threat to the 
evangelical community—as the evolution debates have often been cast—but rather, science 
authorizes and insulates the evangelical worldview from the charge of having cloaked its policy 
preferences with the authority of science.77 In this rendering, Christian values become the 
neutral, unbiased values and anything that parades as Christian (recognizable by any non-
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capitalist leanings), without the corresponding enactment of Beisner’s interpretation of 
stewardship, risks toppling the Christian worldview altogether.78  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that it is important to understand white evangelical climate change 
denial as a dynamic feature of the “resonance machine” between capitalism and Christianity in 
the United States, and that epistemologies of ignorance are vital to trace these processes. In 
particular, examining the epistemic practices of this group’s elite illustrates that the success of 
the project lies in the extent to which the grounds for knowledge are also grounds for 
membership in the group, at the same time as they posit the group’s existence as precarious. 
Beisner is an exemplar of this epistemic maneuvering. His bundling of scientific practice and 
economic progress together under the rubric of divine mandate paradoxically (and at the same 
time, likely intentionally) leaves little room for participation in his so revered marketplace of 
exchange.  
A recent study published in the Journal of Geoscience Education found that conservative 
evangelical undergraduate students reported high levels of shift in perspective on issues related 
to climate change after hearing a lecture from an evangelical climate scientist, where the 
scientific research was presented through an evangelical lens, accompanied by a discussion of 
how science and faith differ, and included a discussion of theology-based ethics.79 The 
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researchers came to the conclusion that the relevant factor at play was a clear delineation 
between fact and belief, but I argue that a return to Connolly’s resonance-machine gives us a 
different read on this outcome. We might instead call attention to the affective dimension at play 
in this dynamic. The relevant distinction then is not that students have achieved sudden clarity 
about the technical distinctions between facts and beliefs, but rather that to tell a story about a 
certain set of facts from the perspective of membership in a group allows for the facts to gain 
traction in a way they might not otherwise have had.    
Beisner’s solicitation of the neutrality of scientific practice for the pursuit of conservative 
evangelical ends lays important groundwork for questions about both the possibility and the 
value of neutrality at all, which will be taken up more explicitly in the following chapter. 
Epistemologies of ignorance as a critical project invite a consideration of the role that 
membership in a group plays in knowledge production generally, in setting the terms of 
engagement with knowledge, and in drawing the boundaries around the consequences of acting 
in response to or in light of knowledge. In particular, a broader and more dynamic understanding 
of what ignorance is and how it works is important for revealing how the narrow way that a 
classic, Enlightenment conception of ignorance as lack lets us off the hook for taking seriously 
the structural forces that shape our engagements with knowledge—scientific or otherwise. 
Though Beisner is on one hand guilty of what Connolly has elsewhere called the “Big Lie 
scenario,” “in which you accuse the other of what you are doing and then repeat the charge 
endlessly,”80 he is able to do so under the auspices of an explicit commitment to transparency, 
falsifiability, and neutrality. As I argue in the next chapter, critical engagements with other 
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scientific concepts – engagements that share many intellectual affinities with epistemologies of 
ignorance – should be understood as responding to precisely this counter-intuitive mode by 
which neutrality, rather than serving as a measurement for the refinement of scientific practice, 
more often serves to draw a boundary around who is recognized as a relevant or legitimate 
participant in a given debate. 
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Chapter 3 
Anti-Science, Objectivity, and Reason 
 
In a 1996 essay titled “Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and its Real Enemies,” 
Elisabeth A. Lloyd debunks a series of myths about the perceived anti-scientific nature of 
feminist engagements with science.1 According to her interlocutors, the “anti-science” charge is 
justified by the following assessments: feminists forsake evidence and truth in favor of 
ideological standards; feminists reject objectivity in favor of relativism; feminists either do not 
understand, or are hostile to the ideals of scientific inquiry; and feminists (incorrectly) renounce 
the idea of rationality itself. For Lloyd, these charges are especially puzzling in light of the fact 
that the supposed culprits of these crimes are thinkers who have explicitly and systematically 
rejected all of these positions. Indeed, the feminists frequently invoked in these condemnations 
of feminist science are “among the most overtly pro-science feminists.” Lloyd’s goal in her piece 
is “to identify and examine central assumptions and loci of concern that play important roles in 
attempts to discredit feminist contributions to the sciences and to science studies.”2 I suggest in 
this chapter that her work in this essay can serve as a point of departure for thinking about other 
charges of “anti-science,” and the central assumptions and loci of concern that constitute 
recourse to the authority of a rational, detached, objective Science—namely, in the case of 
climate change debate.  
In public discussion over the veracity of the anthropogenic climate change thesis in the 
United States, the anti-science charge is, and has been, leveled at and from all directions. One 
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frequently encounters such denouncements as “scientific fascism,”3 “a disgrace to the 
profession,”4 “eco-tyranny,”5 “hoodwinking,”6 “obscured the truth,”7 “betrayal of science and 
reason,”8 and “objectivity has been tossed out the window,”9 among countless others. These 
denouncements about the failure to be objective are always bundled with concerns about the 
political and ideological motivations and commitments that have precluded objective evaluation 
of the facts. It may be tempting to look at this debate and its surrounding discourse and claim 
that the critics of feminist science had it right – just look at what a mess it is when ideology 
enters the scientific process. I argue, however, that we ought to investigate the central 
assumptions and loci of concern that facilitate multiple and opposing claims to rationality and 
objectivity, not for the express purpose of discovering which claims are right (although I argue 
that we can uncover new grounds with which to say climate change deniers are wrong), but 
rather for the purpose of moving the discussion beyond what appears to be an increasingly 
entrenched rhetorical impasse. I argue that both modes of engaging climate change debate have 
problematically privileged a detached, rational, individual subject. Where Lloyd wants to 
develop the distinctions and frameworks necessary for “the rest of us [in the philosophy of 
                                               
3 Richard Harris, “Stolen Climate Emails Cause a Ruckus in Congress,” National Public Radio, 
All Things Considered, December 2, 2009; Richard Harris, “Stolen E-mails Raise Questions on 
Climate Research,” National Public Radio, November 25, 2009.  
4 Mark Steyn, “A Disgrace to the Profession”: The World’s Scientists – in their own words – on 
Michael E Mann, His Hockey Stick, and Their Damage to Science (New Hampshire: Stockade 
Books, 2015). 
5 Brian Sussman, Eco-Tyranny: How the Left’s Green Agenda Will Dismantle America 
(Washington D.C.: WND Books, 2012).  
6 Julian Simon, The Hoodwinking of a Nation (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1999).  
7 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M Conway, rom Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: 
Bloomsbury Press, 2010). 
8 Paul Ehrlich, Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens 
Our Future (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1998). 
9 Roy Spencer, The Great Global Warming Blunder: How Mother Nature Fooled the World’s 
Top Climate Scientists (New York: Encounter Books, 2010). 
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science] to move on,”10 I suggest that feminist engagements with reason/rationality and 
objectivity reveal some of the limitations of climate change discourse in its contemporary 
manifestations, namely its (conscious or unconscious) reproduction of an abstract, masculine 
knowing subject.  
Two points of clarification are necessary. First, as in the preceding chapters of the 
dissertation, my aim is not to discredit “alarmists” and confer legitimacy upon deniers.11 I argue 
instead that feminist attempts to demystify the authority of science should prove useful for 
furthering and sharpening scientific inquiry in the context of global climate change or 
environmental crises. In my own understanding of the nature of climate science, its scope, and 
the challenges involved in making predictions, it is a form of inquiry that is quite amenable to the 
insights of feminist science studies. Thus, an embrace of feminist approaches to science provides 
alternative frameworks for engaging with climate change deniers that do not require a 
commitment to understanding (or preserving an understanding of) science as something that 
happens independently of social structures. Whereas someone like Naomi Klein argues that 
climate change deniers’ appeals to serious disagreement about climate science are merely a 
pretense for an extremist neoliberal political agenda,12 I argue that appeals to an objective and 
authoritative science that is indifferent to human concerns serve a discursive function that we 
should still pay attention to, in spite of—or perhaps in addition to—their motivations. The central 
                                               
10 Lloyd, “Science and Anti-Science,” 218.  
11 I use the term alarmists in this chapter in particular because it is a term that deniers have 
conferred upon the camp that argues that anthropogenic climate change poses a global threat that 
requires an organized political response. Deniers likewise frequently denounce the designation 
“denier” or “skeptic” as another tool of the Green establishment to discredit any dissention—
they insist rather that they are simply entertaining alternative hypotheses in the interests of 
furthering science.  
12 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014).  
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question of this chapter, then, asks what is the work that the charge of “anti-science” does? I 
argue that, even if explicitly used for political ends by disparaging the scientific credibility of the 
opponent, the charge serves to uphold the authority of a science whose aims are best pursued by 
a neutral, rational, and objective (read: white, western, male) observer.  
Secondly, I do not expect to convince political neoliberal climate change deniers to come 
around on the idea of a socially situated science, whose techniques and questions become refined 
over time in conversation with the emancipatory aims of social justice broadly, and feminist 
goals and ideals specifically. I do argue, building on the arguments of the preceding chapters, 
that a critical reading of the epistemic demands and commitments at work in this debate is 
necessary for revealing the limitations of a debate haunted by the specter of “the invisible hand 
of the marketplace of scientific ideas.”13 To engage in this revealing here, I trace the concepts of 
ideology, objectivity, and reason as they manifest in each of these debates. I suggest that feminist 
engagements with reason and objectivity provide new grounds with which to further public 
discussion about climate change, without recourse to a “Truth” about the nature of things that 
exists outside of our human attempts to discover it. In particular, feminist engagements that 
engage multiple axes of both oppression and analysis—ones that provide grounds 
complementary to similar anti-racist, decolonial projects—are crucial for an engagement with an 
area of science that straddles the traditional divide between human and nature, thus my turn to 
Patricia Hill Collins below.  
Relatedly, I further argue that taking a feminist approach to the social study of science 
helps to reveal the ways in which environmental science may already be engaging in knowledge 
practices that are amenable to emancipatory political projects and feminist futures, or to the goals 
                                               
13 Lloyd, “Science and Anti-Science,” 248. 
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of a scientific practice that is embedded in and critically responsive to its society, in at least two 
ways. First, methodologically, as Timothy Luke has argued, climatological science carries within 
it a form of social critique – it contains an implicit transgression of dichotomies such as 
nature/society, city/country, and urban/rural, while at the same time locating, through its 
rigorous scientific methods, the development of capitalism as the originary feature of a warming 
planet.14 In this sense, the traditional positivist distinction between human as subject and nature 
as object no longer holds. Though this is not a new argument (as we saw in the introduction, 
philosophical and geological debate over how to characterize this era of financialization of the 
global economy and drastic ecological shifts are preoccupied with negotiating and navigating the 
collapse of this distinction15), in this chapter I am interested in extending the general argument to 
specifically analyze the way discourse about “the science” negotiates these concepts. Second, the 
fact that scientists or science enthusiasts have been instigators and agitators for 
environmentalism as a political movement, I think suggests not a vast ideological conspiracy that 
undermines the practice of good science, but rather illustrates precisely the socially embedded 
nature of scientific inquiry. To treat nature not as a passive object available for human 
consumption, but as a dynamic entity deeply entwined in human existence lets researchers ask 
different questions, explore different modes for answering these questions, and in some sense 
demands that inquiry and responsiveness go hand-in-hand.  
                                               
14 Timothy Luke, “Climatologies as Social Critique: The Social Construction/Creation of Global 
Warming, Global Dimming, and Global Cooling,” in Political Theory and Global Climate 
Change, edited by Steve Vanderheiden, 121-152 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
15 Donna J. Haraway, Staying With the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016); Jason W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and 
the Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2016); Braidotti, Rosi. The Posthuman (Cambridge 
and Malden: Polity Press, 2013). 
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The chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first section, I offer some historical background 
to the debate over climate science, as well as highlight some of the discursive resonances 
between the anti-science charge in this debate and the anti-science charge lobbied at feminist 
philosophers of science. The crucial thread linking these two charges, on my view, is a 
demarcation of the boundaries of science and ideology—the former understood to be secured by 
the absence of the latter. In order to demonstrate the limits of this dynamic, I turn in the second 
and third sections to examining how feminist theorists have engaged the concepts of objectivity 
and reason, respectively. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a discussion building on the 
argument in chapter one, of how environmental science and feminist philosophy of science are in 
some ways important methodological (and political) bedfellows.16  
 
Science vs. Ideology  
Lloyd argues that critics of feminist science have placed themselves in a double bind. In 
order to uphold the democratic ideals of openness and participation in the sciences, they must 
condemn engagements with science that are perceived to be motivated by any ideals at all. 
Ideology then becomes a catchall phrase for any ideals that enter the process of knowledge 
production except those of the scientific method, which because they are/have proven to work as 
tools for ascertaining the truth about the nature of things, cannot be ideology. Ideology is 
therefore explicitly contrasted with standards for both reason and objectivity. I argue here that 
this strict conceptual division between ideology on the one hand, and reason and objectivity on 
the other, is one that has been replicated over and over again in environmental debates—real 
                                               
16 I borrow the idea of political bedfellows from Lila Abu-Lughod’s assessment of what is 
required for transnational feminist solidarity; Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need 
Saving? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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knowledge can only be accessed by impartial observation of actual data; scientific integrity 
consists in presenting the findings of empirical data as they actually are, rather than in 
accordance with a predetermined worldview or political agenda; we must strive for the most 
unbiased understanding of the most objective and comprehensive data; etc.17 If one were to 
remove the identifying information or political valence, it would seem as though we have a 
consensus—science consists in an objective evaluation of actually observed data, which can be 
openly debated in a setting uninfluenced by the interests of politics, money, or individually held 
beliefs. Further, these are necessary constraints for protecting the credibility of science, and its 
position as impartial or impervious to the goings on of the social world. How then have we all 
managed to butcher the integrity and authority of the thing we all so revere? Though the 
particulars of the more high profile/public debates over global warming/climate change differ, 
there is a central structure and character of argument threading these debates that is best 
exemplified in three historical examples and that continues into our current moment: the bet 
between environmentalist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon in 1980 over the extent to 
which population growth posed a global environmental threat in the form of resource scarcity;18 
MIT’s Dr. Richard Lindzen’s public rebuttal of NASA’s James Hansen’s 1988 testimony to 
Congress about the dangers of human-caused climate change; and what Naomi Oreskes and Erik 
                                               
17 Paul and Anne Ehrlich, Betrayal of Science and Reason; Norman Meyers & Julian Simon, 
Scarcity or Abundance; Roy Spencer, The Great Global Warming Blunder; James Hansen, 
Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and our Last 
Chance to Save Humanity (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2009); Mark Steyn, ‘A Disgrace to the 
Profession’; G Dedrick Robinson, and Gene D Robinson III, Global Warming, Alarmists, 
Skeptics, & Deniers: A Geoscientist Looks at the Science of Climate Change (Santa Fe: 
Moonshine Cove Publishing: 2012); Tim Ball, The Deliberate Corruption of Climate Science 
(Seattle: Stairway Press, 2014). 
18 Paul Sabin, The Bet: Paul Ehrlich, Julian Simon, and Our Gamble over Earth’s Future (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Julian Simon, Hoodwinking The Nation; Ehrlich, Paul and 
Anne Ehrlich. Population Bomb (Cutchogue: Buccaneer Books, 1971).  
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M. Conway term the “manufactured public debate” between scientist Ben Santer and two retired 
physicists with conservative think tank George C. Marshall Institute, Frederick Seitz and Fred 
Singer in the mid-1990s.19 Of particular interest in each case is the way in which ideology and 
science become construed as opposing forces.  
These cases are historically important for the ways in which they captured public 
attention, although there are small differences. Each “alarmist” was a scientist compelled to 
either take their findings to the public, or to defend their scientific work in public--whereas each 
skeptic/denier chose a specific scientist or scientific conclusion as a target for their public 
criticism. In the case of scientist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon, Ehrlich was a 
frequent guest on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson throughout the 1970s promoting his 
concerns about the threat of overpopulation, and Simon felt compelled to enter public discourse 
in reaction to what he perceived as Ehrlich’s grossly over-exaggerated warnings. For NASA’s 
James Hansen and MIT’s Richard Lindzen, Lindzen’s public denouncement of Hansen’s 
scientific findings followed on the heels of Hansen’s 1988 presentation on atmospheric warming 
to the white house, and intensified following Hansen’s 2001 presentation to the Bush 
administration’s Climate Task Force. Between Ben Santer, Frederick Seitz, and Fred Singer the 
situation was a bit different. Though Santer was not already a public figure in the way that 
Ehrlich and Hansen were, he become public by virtue of the backlash against his involvement 
with the IPCC report in 1995. In all three cases, the “controversy” was covered extensively in 
                                               
19 The relationship of the George C. Marshall institute to the Cornwall Alliance is relevant here: 
George C. Marshall institute reformed into CO2 Coalition in 2015 (in conjunction with the Koch 
brothers). Their demand that costs be “easily quantifiable” resonates with Beisner’s discussion 
on “scientific misconduct” from the prior chapter.  
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journalistic and popular venues,20 though Oreskes and Conway rightly note that by the time 
Seitz, Singer, and the George C. Marshall institute waged their public campaign against Santer, 
media outlets were justifying this coverage by reference to the “fairness doctrine” of balanced 
reporting.21 These cases also share the common thread of a public back and forth—each alarmist 
took to a public venue in order to defend their position, their science, and to point out flaws in 
the attack against them. And in each case, the alarmist justified their move into the public sphere 
as an ethical requirement rooted in their scientific study/commitment to scientific principles—
although they each took up the ethical call in different ways. Crucially, these three debates track 
the spirit and trajectory of the entire “so-called climate debate,” which as climate journalist 
Elizabeth Kolbert describes, we might trace back to the backlash against the 1965 report on 
global warming to President Lyndon B. Johnson.22  
Although the debate between Ehrlich and Simon did not explicitly begin as an “anti-
science” discursive battle, it has come to represent the larger ideological conflict between the 
visions for the future encapsulated in the environmental and neoliberal positions—namely, if the 
economists win, are we catapulting toward a planet inhospitable to human existence? Or, if the 
environmentalists win, are we facing a future bereft of human ingenuity and freedom? Though 
both positions have a somewhat defensive doomsday element contained in their structure of 
argument (we risk the worst-case scenario by conceding to the other position), the neoliberal 
position has historically been characterized as that of the optimist, particularly in the case of 
                                               
20 This included editorial pieces in the journals Science and Nature, as well as in The Washington 
Post.  
21 For Oreskes and Conway, this was a key tactic of the “manufactured doubt” campaigns of the 
tobacco industry, and later of climate change denial, and a key component of Robert Proctor’s 
notion of manufactures ignorance.  
22 Elizabeth Kolbert, “Listening to James Hansen on Climate Change—Thirty Years Ago and 
Now,” The New Yorker, June 20, 2018.  
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Ehrlich and Simon. For Julian Simon—an economist at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign—his utilitarian belief that the measure of right and wrong in society should be the 
“greatest happiness of the greatest number,”23 eventually led him to welcome population growth 
as representative of progress, and as a necessary condition for more people to live productive and 
meaningful lives. Historian Paul Sabin chronicles how Ehrlich become the target of Simon’s 
increasing frustration and disillusionment with alarmism over population growth in his book The 
Bet.24  Ehrlich—a biologist at Stanford University—was so concerned about the possibility of 
population growth leading to resource depletion, mass starvation, spread of disease, and social 
unrest that he took it upon himself to bring his research to the public in whatever means possible 
throughout the 70s. The central conflict between the two—between the biologist and the 
economist—unfolded in public in the form of a bet. In 1980, Simon challenged Ehrlich (in the 
pages of Social Science Quarterly) to a wager, and Ehrlich in turn bet Simon that the cost of five 
industrial metals (chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten) would increase over the next ten 
years.25 If Ehrlich were to win the wager, it would signal to the public that there were limits to 
economic growth that would lead to resource scarcity and environmental disaster. If Simon were 
to win, it would legitimate his optimism that markets and new technology were inevitably 
improving human welfare and thus should not be regulated or contained.  
Ehrlich’s and Simon’s methodological and ideological critiques of each other were 
intimately intertwined, and in fact, Simon in particular often invoked the phrase “bad news” to 
describe journalism that he thought used “exaggerated statistics” to manipulate audiences.26 He 
                                               
23 Paul Sabin, The Bet, 7 
24 Ibid.  
25 Julian Simon, “Robinson Crusoe Was Not Mainly a Resource Allocator,” Social Science 
Quarterly 70, no. 2 (June 1989): 471-478.  
26 Paul Sabin, The Bet, 131-133.  
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specifically took issue with the exponential growth models that Ehrlich and his wife, Anne, used 
in their book The Limits to Growth—claiming that they were irresponsible, seductive, and 
bewitching. The Ehrlichs in turn denounced Simon’s attack on their models as the “tired old 
argument” typical of an economist who “know[s] nothing about geology.”27 As their debate 
intensified around the setting of the wager, Ehrlich and Simon both engaged in two rhetorical 
tactics that are still prominent in anti-science discourse. The first tactic is to flag one small piece 
of evidence that either challenges, or more commonly fails to confirm, the opponent’s thesis—
and second is to home in on another piece of evidence that demonstrates the presence of ideology 
corrupting the scientific process in the opponent. For Simon, Ehrlich’s insistence on the rights of 
nonhuman species to exist clouded his interpretation of the data and led him to dismiss evidence 
of human progress. For Ehrlich, Simon was blinded by the promise of technology, favoring 
human-centric measures of the quality of life over ones that centered ecosystems. They accused 
one another of letting ideology intrude on crucial elements of good scientific practice—the 
collection of evidence, the selection of measurement, and interpretation of the findings.  
The debate between NASA’s James Hansen and MIT’s Richard Lindzen is somewhat 
unique among these historical examples in that Hansen himself seems in some ways to be 
grappling with precisely the limits that I am exploring here, of engaging this debate purely on 
scientific grounds—though his position is a bit complicated. On one hand, he narrates his move 
into the public sphere as having been required by his scientific observations, and he is deeply 
attuned to the ways that his opponents deploy scientific language to encourage skepticism about 
a set of scientific conclusions. On the other, he chalks the success of their campaign up to his and 
other scientists’ failure to communicate the science effectively. He frequently says in interviews 
                                               
27 Ibid, 135.   
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that he regrets not making the story clear enough for the public,28 and that he in fact holds 
scientists responsible for not making the urgency of the situation acutely felt.  
To give a bit of context for his view, Hansen’s debate with Lindzen began in the late 80s, 
continued through the early aughts, and was in large part facilitated by the latest Bush 
administration. As Hansen recounts in his 2009 book Storms of My Grandchildren, he was first 
invited to Washington to testify to a Senate committee chaired by Tim Wirth (Colorado - 
Democrat) in 1988, where he “declared, with 99 percent confidence,”29 that the planet was 
entering a period of “long-term warming” as a result of the human-caused greenhouse gas effect 
in the atmosphere. Hansen, dissatisfied with the way his testimony was received (although it was 
an unusually hot summer, the public was confused about how massive hydrologic activity that 
year—heavy rains, extreme flooding, and intense thunderstorms, tornadoes, and tropical 
storms—fit into the global warming thesis), tried one year later to correct this confusion by 
explaining how both extremes—drought and flooding—were a result of a warmer atmosphere. 
Unfortunately, when Senator Al Gore received word from Hansen just before this second hearing 
that his written testimony had “been altered by the White House Office of Management and 
Budget to make [his] conclusions about the dangers of global warming appear uncertain,”30 Gore 
alerted the media and Hansen’s attempt to elaborate his earlier testimony was drowned by 
coverage of the controversy over the alteration of his testimony. Hansen resolved to “go back to 
pure science” after this second attempt and stayed out of the limelight for another decade.  
                                               
28 Seth Borenstein, “James Hansen wishes he wasn’t so right about climate change,” Associated 
Press, June 18, 2018; Elizabeth Kolbert, “Listening to James Hansen”; Elizabeth Kolbert, “The 
Catastrophist.” The New Yorker, June 22, 2009; Katherine Bagley, “For James Hansen, the 
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29 James Hansen, Storms of My Grandchildren, xv.  
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In the ensuing decade, atmospheric physicist Richard Lindzen began to turn his attention 
from his earlier work on ozone photochemistry and atmospheric tides to the study of climate 
sensitivity.31 Lindzen was concerned about the validity of computer modeling for predicting 
atmospheric shifts and quickly rose to prominence as a global warming contrarian. In 1998, after 
a decade of avoiding interaction with the media on his research, Hansen agreed to a debate with 
Lindzen and fellow climate denier Pat Michaels. On Hansen’s telling, he agreed because he had 
a “clear scientific purpose”—he wanted to succinctly capture and publish the key scientific 
differences between his view and their view. The table he created for this debate was the same 
table he would go on to present to Vice President Cheney’s “Climate Task Force” in 2001. 
Hansen’s recounting of the task force is a fascinating study of the politics of that moment 
in its own right. Cheney invited many prominent scientists to its first meeting, and the politicians 
in the room seemed to be receptive to the presentations, in spite of the fact that this all took place 
against the lead up to the US refusing to sign on to the Kyoto protocol. Most important for the 
present purposes, however, is what came next. The committee insisted that the next meeting 
should include a scientist who was “not convinced of the reality of concerns about human-made 
global warming.”32 The person they selected for Hansen to face off against was Lindzen (who 
also contributed extensively to the campaign to shed doubt on the link between smoking 
cigarettes and lung cancer that was heavily funded by tobacco companies). In particular, note 
how Hansen characterized his failure to convince the task force of his position.  
                                               
31 Richard Lindzen, “Reflections on Rapid Response to Unjustified Climate Alarm,” Cato 
Institute, September 18, 2014; Richard Lindzen, “Thoughts on the Public Discourse over Climate 
Change,” Merion West, April 25, 2017. 
32 James Hansen, Storms of My Grandchildren, 10. 
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Hansen recounts how Lindzen used his presentation to the task force to deploy precisely 
the rhetorical strategy I outlined above: 
Lindzen used part of his presentation to show graphs of observed data such as 
temperature and precipitation, emphasizing the large fluctuations and possible 
measurement errors. His aim seemed to be a conclusion that global warming is a 
very uncertain proposition. He focused on more local observations...he had 
managed to defuse his earlier assertion about the absence of global warming, 
which had been proven to be wrong. 
Lindzen also spent substantial time questioning the motives of scientists who, he 
said, made ‘alarmist’ statements. His thesis was that most scientists concurred 
with the reality of global warming only because it increased their ability to obtain 
research funding.33 
 
Lindzen, on one hand, flagged local data that failed to confirm the global thesis, and on the other, 
flagged research funding as a piece of evidence demonstrating the failure to be objective of 
scientists who confirmed the global warming thesis. But Hansen’s rebuttal to Lindzen deployed a 
similar strategy. For Hansen, Lindzen’s scientific failures derived from a directionality problem. 
Because Lindzen was “convinced that nature will find ways to cool itself,” he looked for and 
proposed a scientific mechanism to capture this perspective, rather than letting data drive his 
investigation of a possible negative feedback for climate forcings.34 
 Though Hansen repeatedly stresses the strategic and selective mode of argumentation that 
Lindzen practices—he likens Lindzen’s rhetorical strategy to that of lawyer rather than 
scientist—he nevertheless dedicated space, both in his scientific work and in his book written for 
a more popular audience, to engaging Lindzen on the science. Even while he notes that the 
structure of scientific argumentation is not usefully adapted to convincing a lay audience of its 
implications, his efforts to combat this other mode of argumentation always return to an 
insistence on the primacy of the data, and the sanctity of the methods and practices of good 
                                               
33 Ibid, 14-5. 
34 Ibid, 55. 
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science. In effect, even as Hansen with one stroke of the pen recognizes the limits of his own 
practices/criteria for achieving his desired ends, in the next he nonetheless insists on them, 
returns to them, and holds fast to the authority they ostensibly secure.  
 In their book Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on 
Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Oreskes and Conway argue that the public 
debate between Santer on one side, and Seitz and Singer on the other, was manufactured (think 
with Proctor in the previous chapter, here) as a corporate/neoliberal strategy to discredit climate 
science,35 but note how the discourse unfolded. Santer, who is an atmospheric scientist at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote chapter 8 of the IPCC’s 1995 assessment report 
on climate change—the first report to conclude that warming was indeed caused by greenhouse 
gases. Chapter 8, “Detection of Climate Change and Attribution of Causes,” specifically 
summarized the evidence of this conclusion. Seitz and Singer accused Santer of making changes 
to the report explicitly to deceive policy makers and the public. The debate then over what the 
facts were—and relatedly, what good science consists in—took place in a series of op-eds in the 
Wall Street Journal and in open letters from different organizations either condemning Santer’s 
chapter of the IPCC, or in support of both him as a scientist, and his science (method and 
conclusions) as legitimate.36  
                                               
35 Oreskes and Conway use “neoliberalism” throughout their book in the political neoliberal 
sense that I outlined in the introduction. 
36 Science and Environment Policy Project, “The IPCC Controversy,” 
http://sepp.org./archive/controv/ipcccont/ipccont.html; Frederick Seitz, “A Major Deception on 
‘Global Warming,’” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1996; Benjamin Santer, et al. “Letter to the 
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 The substance of Seitz and Singer’s accusations of Santer was that Santer had corrupted 
the peer review process – a fundamental aspect of the successful working of the scientific 
method. They had compared the report that was approved and signed by the contributing 
scientists to the version that was ultimately published and had picked out several passages where 
wording was changed or deleted. They argued further that these changes were not merely 
changes of language for readability, or other editorial preferences, but that nearly all of the 
changes worked to “remove hints of skepticism.”37 The Global Climate Coalition took up this 
criticism, arguing that the IPCC had institutionalized “scientific cleansing”—or the dismissal of 
evidence that disproves the hypothesis.38 In an editorial note in the June 13, 1996 issue of the 
scientific journal Nature, it was noted that the complaints about the revision process were not 
entirely groundless—revisions had been made to tidy up the text such that it conformed to the 
conventions of a policy recommendation.39 While the authors at Nature were in support of the 
IPCC’s report, they nonetheless took up the debate over whether any scientific conventions had 
been violated that would invalidate the results of the study—importantly, engaging these critics 
in the realm of science/scientific method.  
 The ideological controversy posed by this public contention over the potential corruption 
of the scientific process was made quite explicit—they mapped on neatly to the earlier debates 
between Ehrlich and Simon, and Hansen and Lindzen. Seitz and Singer were concerned about 
the effects of these policy decisions on energy policy, which would “have an enormous impact 
on U.S. oil and gas prices and on the international economy.”40 Santer, the IPCC, and the editors 
                                               
37 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt.  
38 Ibid.  
39 “Climate debate must not overheat,” Nature 381 (June 13, 1996): 539. 
40 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt,  
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at Nature were concerned that the United States’ failure to commit itself to an energy policy that 
would limit the emission of greenhouse gases would ultimately lead to the global failure of the 
task, contributing extensively to “adverse impacts on human health, with significant loss of life,” 
“increases in the potential transmission of vector-borne diseases,” the crumbling of human 
infrastructure as related to floods, droughts, and storm surges, and the potential mass migration 
of populations from less technologically advanced societies who would be less capable of 
adapting to new weather conditions.41 For both parties, the political stakes worked in two 
directions. For Santer, Seitz and Singer’s motivation for critiquing his report on scientific 
grounds was clearly ideologically motivated. Yet, rather than dismiss their criticism outright, or 
merely decry their criticism as ideologically motivated, Santer engaged them on both fronts. He 
needed to defend the scientific authority of his conclusions in order to be justified in the policy 
prescriptions that followed from them. And their opposition to these policy prescriptions in turn 
revealed both the ideological and anti-scientific character of Seitz and Singer’s objections. For 
Seitz and Singer on the other hand, Santer’s policy prescription was evidence itself of the 
ideological motivation for supposedly corrupting the peer review process.  
This two-prong rhetorical approach to rejecting scientific claims in scientific terms, or on 
“scientific” grounds, is now a full-fledged political operation on the right.42 In December 2015 
for example, Senator Ted Cruz convened a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Space, 
                                               
41 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “IPCC Second Assessment: A Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” 1995. 
42 This approach resonates with the way Beisner formulates the problem for evangelicals, as 
discussed in the prior chapter, though it is important to note that Beisner has not claimed to be 
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Science, and Competitiveness (of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation) entitled, “Data or Dogma? Promoting Open Inquiry in the Debate over the 
Magnitude of Human Impact on Earth’s Climate.” At the outset of this hearing, Cruz made the 
following claim: “Had [lawmakers] actually looked to the science and the evidence…facts 
matter, science matters, data matters. That’s what this hearing is about. Data. According to 
satellite data there has been no significant global warming in the last 16 years…Public policy 
should follow science, and evidence, and data.”43 Again we see recourse to this two-prong 
approach. For Cruz, inconclusive satellite data is enough to call into question the entire thesis of 
anthropogenic climate change, and the piece of evidence demonstrating the infiltration of 
ideology was the Democrats’ “prebuttal” to his hearing. Cruz sarcastically quipped, “How dare 
the science subcommittee in the United States Senate hear testimony from scientists about actual 
science!”44 But what is “actual science” here supposed to refer to?  
As we have seen, similarly to our critics of feminist science, at the same time as it has 
largely been a political tactic of the neoliberal right, both deniers and alarmists in the climate 
context bundle the anti-science charge with evidence of the counter-position’s failure to keep 
ideology (that is, all values but reason and objectivity) at bay. These accusations have included 
such disparagements as: differing motives; misinformation; seemingly authoritative ideas; 
distortions of science; twisting of findings; bandwagon; anecdotal; hiding evidence; theological 
or philosophical perspective; in defense of a position, rather than seeking truth. One key 
difference between these accusations of anti-science and those made of feminist science, 
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however, is that for both deniers and alarmists, the failure to keep ideology at bay is itself 
evidence of each other’s forsaking of the scientific mandate to pursue truth, and thus the 
inaccuracy of their claims. The charge against feminists, on the other hand, is not simply that 
they have failed to uphold the integrity of science because of their impartiality, but rather that 
they explicitly reject scientific objectivity and reason in favor of ideology, specifically feminist 
ideology. It is in this key difference—where the goal of inquiry is the refinement of the tools of 
inquiry themselves, rather than the disproving of the opponents’ conclusions—where I suggest 
feminist philosophy of science has much to offer.  
 
Objectivity  
 There are three key feminist engagements with objectivity that I argue demonstrate on 
one hand, the false equivalence of feminist critiques of science with anti-science, and on the 
other, the limits of the anti-science charge vis-à-vis standards for objectivity. First is the 
distinction between critique and rejection, where feminists have argued that critique aims to 
broaden access to a set of institutions, practices, or social goods whereas rejection retains an 
exclusionary element; second is the historical emergence of objectivity as an ideal, which 
feminists have argued needs to be understood as a socially situated value in its own right; and 
third is the theoretical justification for an alternate standard, the significance of which I 
demonstrate here by way of engagement with Patricia Hill Collins’s proposal for a black feminist 
standpoint. 
For Lloyd, the criticism that feminists reject objectivity and reason in favor of ideology 
reveals tension between the critics and the social view they attack (feminism) on notions of 
openness about information, the maintenance of social authority and stability, as well as 
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scientific and democratic ideals. Her response to these criticisms’ hinges on the insight that 
critique is not the same thing as rejection. Exposing the values, assumptions, and power 
dynamics embedded in the scientific method does not equate to a rejection of science. Neither do 
challenges to specific instances and aspects of scientific activity necessarily amount to 
undermining scientific authority. These critical projects do, however, require investigating (with 
scientific rigor) the values, assumptions, and beliefs about the relations between research and the 
aspects of the world it seeks to explain—including objectivity as a value/assumption/belief.  
 The tension over information and control specifically emerges out of the authoritative 
role scientific knowledge plays in the structure of our social, political, and economic institutions 
and practices. When feminist and radical critics, therefore, expose the (usually unconscious) 
weaknesses or self-serving interests of some scientific approaches and scientists, the whole 
system is thought by the critics to be at risk for destabilization. Lloyd points out that there is 
some truth to this anxiety (as we have seen in the case of climate change debate), however, the 
social study of science is nonetheless vitally important for the cultivation and refinement of 
scientific knowledge and methods. Indeed, if we are able to generate standards by which to 
compare different systems and methods of investigating nature and producing knowledge, we 
must have an account of the intricacies of these systems and methods. We must be able to 
understand which assumptions and values play a role, and how precisely conflicting interests and 
motivations interact with the scientific process and with scientific knowledge.45 
 This argument that the process of engaging with values, assumptions, interests, and 
motivations in the study of science is in fact part of the scientific process is a crucial argument 
for thinking about climate change discourse. Lloyd argues that the critics she considers are right 
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to worry about defending the authority of the sciences against religious fundamentalism and 
superstition, and indeed it is evident that a climate debate that only superficially discusses the 
role of values (i.e. claims climate science is wrong/false/not science because it’s leftist fascism, 
rather than opening up for debate which values ought to play a role in the production of 
knowledge about the climate, and what role those values should play), shares no commitments to 
the ameliorative, social justice project of feminist interventions in science.  
  Consider further, the historical emergence of objectivity. Sandra Harding has argued that 
the term has no single meaning, and has been shown to be an historically contested concept.46 
Not only has it shifted in meaning over time, but it also lacks a fixed referent—in some moments 
in time it refers to specific groups of individuals thought to be capable of producing reliable 
knowledge, and in other moments it refers to particular kinds of or approaches to inquiry. In 
some cases, the term refers to either the method or the outcome of research. In the latter case, the 
term then means something more approximate to “true.”47 Harding’s point in calling attention to 
the term’s lack of fixity is not to say that is useless and we ought to discard it altogether, but is 
rather to situate the central ideals of positivist-empiricism in their historical moments of 
emergence—specifically, in conjunction with modernization theory in the wake of World War II. 
For Harding, as for many other historians and sociologists of science,48 positivism—with its 
commitments to value-free, objective, and rational inquiry—was a key philosophy that supported 
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global development projects and the attempt to spread democracy.49 Thus, the commitment to 
open, inclusive, value-free inquiry is not simply the historical progression or unfolding of a 
science indifferent to human affairs, but is rather a historically situated commitment to 
democracy and the free market, and ought to be seen as such. 
I want to conclude the discussion of objectivity by looking closely at Patricia Hill 
Collins’s articulation of the black feminist standpoint as an alternative standard for positionality 
vis-à-vis the object of research. I argue that her formulation provides a crucial blueprint for the 
refinement/adjustment of standards of objectivity in the case of environmental science—
specifically in the way she articulates the epistemic value of connectedness. 
For Hill Collins, objectivity is thought to only be attainable by eliminating all varieties of 
human characteristics—that of values, emotions, experience, etc.—with the exception of 
rationality. This method of scientific inquiry requires distancing of the researcher from his/her 
object of study, requires the absence of emotions, emphasizes the inappropriateness of ethics and 
values, and prefers adversarial debates as the method of ascertaining truth.50 On her view, these 
criteria for legitimate knowledge production are incompatible with a black feminist 
epistemology. “Such criteria ask African-American women to objectify themselves, devalue their 
emotional life, displace their motivations for furthering knowledge about black women, and 
confront, in an adversarial relationship, those who have more social, economic, and professional 
power than they.”51 Black women need an alternative epistemology for assessing knowledge 
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claims, one that doesn’t require them to adhere to the hegemonic knowledge regime that has in 
many ways been responsible for, or at the very least complicit in, the maintenance of Black 
women’s oppression and subordination. This alternative epistemology is characterized by several 
elements. Firstly, it borrows from an Afrocentric consciousness that developed out of histories of 
colonialism, imperialism, slavery, apartheid, and various other systems of racial oppression. Hill 
Collins argues that an epistemology that is both feminist and Afrocentric is significant in its 
“enrichment of our understanding of how subordinate groups create knowledge that enables them 
to resist oppression.”52 In this sense, Afrocentric feminist epistemology does not claim that Black 
women have a more accurate view of oppression than other groups, but rather that Black 
women’s experiences suggest that the material conditions of oppression can dramatically vary, 
and yet generate similarities in epistemology to other subordinate groups.  
 Another element of Black feminist epistemology in Hill Collins’s view emphasizes 
concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. This means that the wisdom that is acquired 
through everyday experiences about how the dynamics of race, class, and gender subordination 
operate has value for making and assessing knowledge claims.53 Relatedly, Black feminist 
epistemology advocates the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims. “A primary 
epistemological assumption underlying the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims is that 
connectedness rather than separation is an essential component of the knowledge-validation 
process.”54 This notion of connectedness is important both for the literal process of validating 
knowledge—sharing experiences and articulating with others what those experiences mean—and 
also for a theoretical challenge to the individualism of liberalism. If liberalism values the 
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rational, (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) male individual as the relevant source of 
knowledge production, an epistemology that values connectedness challenges individualism and 
its genderedness. Hill Collins additionally argues that a Black feminist epistemology, rather than 
devaluing ethics, adheres to two particular kinds of ethics that are rooted in the experiences of 
Black women—the ethic of caring and the ethic of personal accountability. The ethic of caring, 
on her view, is made up of an emphasis on valuing uniqueness, the appropriateness of emotions, 
and development of the capacity for empathy. These elements of the ethic of caring are rooted in 
both African-American culture and women’s experience for Hill Collins. The use of call and 
response discourse mode in Black church services is an example of the interactive nature of these 
elements in African-American culture, and women’s responsibility for care work exemplifies this 
ethic in women’s experience.55 The ethic of accountability itself is the mechanism that holds 
people accountable for their knowledge claims. This accountability does not entail evaluating 
whether someone has adhered to the objectivity standards of positivism, but rather evaluates 
knowledge claims based on an individual’s connectedness, values, and ethics. In other words, an 
articulation of how values inform one’s knowledge claims is in turn valuable for assessing the 
accountability of those claims. A Black feminist epistemology then not only allows us to produce 
knowledge about Black women’s experiences of subordination, but also provides a framework 
within which to challenge the dominant, hegemonic regime of knowledge production and 
validation.  And importantly for resisting the anti-science criticism, this epistemology proposes 
alternate standards of evaluation that do not require an impossibly detached rationality, but that 
do require an explicit articulation of which values guide the production of knowledge.  
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 A set of criteria for good scientific practice that requires an articulation of one’s values, 
an ethic of personal accountability grounded in one’s connectedness to the object of knowledge, 
and that derives its consciousness from the intersecting histories of capitalism and slavery is 
vastly important for the climate change debate, and amenable to the scope and scale of 
climatological science.  
 
Reason   
The concept of reason has a more sordid history for feminists, which extends beyond the 
European Enlightenment and Cartesian dualism. Feminist epistemologists, political theorists, and 
philosophers of science have all had much to say about the alignment of Reason with maleness, 
universality, and the life of the mind—in particular, paying attention to its opposition to emotion, 
femaleness, particularity, and the body.56 In Lloyd’s work, for the critics of feminists, reason 
stands in opposition to the irrational relativism that feminists supposedly espouse. For both our 
deniers and skeptics, reason functions as a criterion for which to denounce one’s debate 
opponent, and to dismiss the conclusions of their research. My point here in calling attention to 
the rich history of Reason’s maleness is to show how feminist engagements with science recast 
the terms of inclusivity that constitute “good science” or good knowledge production. Feminist 
standards for reasonableness—unmoored from the abstract and universal principles of 
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Enlightenment, or from the gendered dichotomy of mind/body—may provide new and different 
criterion by which to assess whether methods are furthering the aims of inquiry, or whether they 
are furthering the aims of exclusion from the conversation.57 Lloyd argues that critics of feminist 
science engage in the latter—I argue that parties to the debate over anthropogenic climate change 
are also employing tactics for the latter aims. Feminist engagements with the gendered legacy of 
reason again point us to the limits of the scientific standard for neutrality. While at the same 
time, the double bind of critiquing reason—namely, the choice between broadening reason to 
include its others or rejecting it altogether as irretrievably masculine—recalls Haraway’s 
formulation of the science question in feminism from chapter one.  
 This long tradition of treating emotion and the body as an impediment to truth or 
knowledge—where reason/rationality are precursors to the scientific revolution—becomes 
inscribed into the scientific method through the modality of objectivity. As we saw for Hill 
Collins and others, objectivity and reason are intimately intertwined as positivist scientific norms 
and practices. But feminists have also called attention not just to the role that reason plays in 
establishing boundaries around who counts as a knower and what counts as knowledge in the 
context of science, they have also, following Michel Foucault, theorized the broader disciplinary 
function of the concept. As Amy Allen has argued, the challenge for feminists is in confronting 
“the spiral generated by the irreconcilable tension between reason and power, which means that 
we accept that our form of rationality is both dangerous and indispensable.”58 The goal should 
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be, as she argues, to commit ourselves to the “project of developing a more capacious conception 
of reason by reassessing the role played by the body, the affects and emotions, judgment, the 
imagination, in the operation of reason.”59 Again, though this approach is not as specifically 
engaged in refining reason for the express purpose of refining scientific inquiry, Allen’s 
assessment of the importance of critique resonates with Lloyd’s defense of feminist critiques of 
science. She writes, “[For Foucault,] genealogical critique not only reveals historical 
contingency; it also uncovers the historically specific practices through which our contingent 
present has been made. In other words, genealogy as critique involves showing not just that our 
present is contingent but also how it has been contingently formed, so that we can understand not 
only that it can be transformed but also how to go about doing so.”60 When we track the 
exclusionary function of reason, I argue, we have a different angle on the social/political function 
of positivist commitments. They appear much more as an investment in preserving the status 
quo—following Wolin’s argument from chapter one—than as tools for ascertaining the truth of 
things. And further, to recognize these commitments as modes of preserving the status quo 
exposes them as contingent, as constructed, and thus as transformable.  
 
Environmental Science and Emancipatory Political Projects 
 Though I have suggested throughout this dissertation that the concept of the 
Anthropocene itself in some sense demands a reconfiguration of the boundary between human 
and nature, I have not yet said much about how, nor have I specified why approaching this 
argument from the perspective of feminist science studies is important. As a geologic term, the 
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Anthropocene describes a new epoch, defining the Earth’s most recent time period as being 
human-influenced. In other words, it is a proposal dating roughly from industrialization, which 
describes the ways in which atmospheric, geologic, hydrologic, biospheric, and other earth 
systems are altered by human activity—in the case of anthropogenic climate change, earth 
systems have been so altered by human activity that scientists predict it will soon no longer 
sustain human activity, at least in its current arrangements or at its current scale. Outside of earth 
systems sciences, the Anthropocene has invited social theorists to ask how it is that humans 
produced the conditions of their potential own demise, and what we might do differently in order 
to avoid it. A quick survey of recent books with Anthropocene in the title showcases the range of 
topics that it spans: The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us;61 Learning to 
Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization; 62 Anthropocene or 
Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism;63 After Nature: A Politics for the 
Anthropocene;64 Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene;65 and Arts of Living on a 
Damaged Planet: Ghosts and Monsters of the Anthropocene.66 The Anthropocene asks us to 
reimagine history, our relationship to the earth, our conceptualization of civilization, our global 
economy, our modes of organizing collective life. Further, perhaps most importantly for our 
purposes, the Anthropocene as a scientific designation in some sense reimagines the norms and 
practices of science itself—insofar as scientists are simultaneously reconfiguring their categories 
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for and tools of analysis, they are actually engaging in the kind of epic theorizing that Sheldon 
Wolin advocated, as we saw in chapter one.  
In what ways can feminist science studies help us to grapple with these questions? On 
one hand, they extend the repertoire of tools at our disposal to explain how we got here. They 
provide us with cues for ways to reformulate our descriptive and predictive tools. Consider the 
examples of the requirements for monocausality and reductionism.67 If what we are trying to 
explain—interdependent earth/human systems, amplifying effects, tipping points, etc.—are 
phenomena that cannot be captured by monocausal explanations and reductive reasoning, 
feminist science studies reminds us that our tools are made and can be re-made. We should ask 
what social-historical contingencies are built into those requirements, what assumptions about 
the human they smuggle in, and whether they should be refined or be jettisoned. On the other 
hand, feminist science studies offers a provocation for imagining alternate futures.  
Consider Rosi Braidotti’s work on the posthuman.68 Braidotti calls for an expansion of 
theory beyond humanism, arguing that technology, biology, the environment, and all living 
organisms (human and non-human), are reactive, interdependent, and mutually constitutive.69 
Issues like climate change, for Braidotti, do not represent a crisis for humanity with exclusively 
human solutions, but rather demand a renewed effort by transformed interdisciplinary humanities 
to engage critically with the posthuman. She advocates for the development of new 
subjectivities, the embracing of a posthuman ethics, and the construction of an affirmative 
posthumanist politics. On her view, what we can hope is limited by humanism. Reframing 
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theories of subjectivity, ethics, and politics in terms of the posthuman allows for the construction 
of sustainable alternative futures. These are projects that are enabled by a critical engagement 
with the sciences.  
The feminist project of demystifying the progressive narrative of an objective and neutral 
science does not equate to a move to discredit its methods or conclusions. However, to levy the 
charge of “anti-science” by reference to these origin myths as criteria for judgement in some 
sense implies that equivalence.  Where feminist philosophy of science intervenes, is in 
reorienting the conversation around the goals of a demystified –  but still self-reflexive and 
capable of producing knowledge – science. The goal then is to develop criteria by which to 
determine whether parties to a disagreement both share a commitment—not to an out-there, pre-
ordained truth—but rather to the improvement of knowledge by continual reflection on the 
standards for inquiry. Feminist philosophy of science reveals that the charge of “anti-science” is 
neither capacious enough, nor reflexive enough to do this difficult work. In the conclusion, I turn 











“Hard times are coming, when we will be wanting the voices of writers who can see 
alternatives to how we live now, and can see through our fear-stricken society and its obsessive 
technologies, to other ways of being. And even imagine some real ground for hope.”1 
 
 
An overarching question of the dissertation has been: how should we understand the 
intellectual legacy of critical approaches to the sciences against the backdrop of a political 
deadlock in the United States on issues of environmental concern, which is often attributed to the 
phenomenon of science denialism? Methodologically, I have looked to feminist science studies 
for tools to theorize what is at stake in contestations over the authority of science. Because a 
crucial insight of feminist science studies is that the sciences and their societies co-produce one 
another, it offers ample resources to attend with care to the political imaginaries at work in 
debates over science and over the environment. I have demonstrated how it is that the concepts 
and norms of good scientific practice come to counter-intuitively suffuse political positions that 
are commonly thought of as anti-scientific, such as that of climate change denial. 
I have made two types of arguments throughout this dissertation. On one hand, I have 
used feminist approaches and practices as a way to offer a new reading of our current 
predicament: I have demonstrated how a structural neoliberalism—an economistic, technocratic, 
“rational” organizing of collective life—has in some ways legitimated the tools and tactics with 
which political neoliberals (understood as “free” market fundamentalists) take up 
discursive/political space on matters of the environment. On the other hand, I have looked to 
feminist science studies as a way out of this dilemma, arguing for an approach to knowledge that 
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is plural, embedded, embodied, and attuned to asymmetries of power. At the center of my 
analysis is a concern for what prospects for the future are built-in to our methodologies, our 
technologies for seeing, and our regimes of knowledge-making.   
I have made these arguments across differing contexts. It is a predicament that has roots 
in the academy, and that gains ground in wider public contexts. I have shown how, in the 
discipline of political science, the commitment to both discipline and scientism have in some 
ways rendered it a guardian of the status quo—limiting its imaginative scope and capacity to be 
critically engaged in the project of remaking the world. In the landscape of public debate, a 
similar dynamic is at work that manifests somewhat differently. Appeals to rationality—whether 
at the institutional level, or at the epistemic level—serve to insulate market values from public 
scrutiny or debate, at the same time as they promote those values as guardians of the status quo, 
stylized as neutral.  
In chapter one I argued that earlier iterations of what is now often referred to as the 
neoliberalization of the academy—increased disciplinarity and the dominance of behaviorism—
were intertwined with the project of relegating theory to merely a resource for scientific 
descriptions of the world, and with the artificial separation of “theory” from this “real world.” 
Smuggled into this rubric for knowledge production are the values of mid-twentieth century anti-
communist fervor, namely an ideological commitment to the specific type of freedom that the 
“free market” ostensibly secures. Given the critique of capitalism embedded in the anthropogenic 
climate change thesis, I argued that an updated version of Sheldon Wolin’s articulation of the 
imaginative vision in political theorizing—one that takes seriously the feminist, anti-racist, 
postcolonial critiques of vision and of science—is both the purview of environmental political 
thought, and a necessary rubric for it to harness that which is required for a broader, richer, more 
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capacious imagining of the possibilities for the ordering of collective life. Specifically, I turned 
to Donna Haraway as an interlocuter for Wolin in order to highlight one of the ways in which 
feminist debates about epistemology are particularly salient in the context of debates about 
climate change. For deniers such as Calvin Beisner, and critics of feminist philosophy of science 
from within philosophy of science, “feminists” are a single entity with a unified rejection of 
knowledge practices for the purpose of reversing gendered hierarchies. As Haraway’s work 
navigating debates among feminists demonstrates, the feminist project is not a monolithic 
conspiracy. It is a project that includes interrogating the role of knowledge practices in 
establishing the world, and about developing the tools to know more and to know better. In this 
sense, though Haraway and Patricia Hill Collins have different views on the question of whether 
feminists need to retain a notion of objectivity, they are both committed to the project of refining 
the tools for inquiry to offer better accounts of the world.   
In order to address the other modes of neoliberalism at work in contestations over the 
authority of science on questions of the environment—the attendant political rationalities, their 
affects and intensities—I have looked to two different cases where political neoliberalism infuses 
climate change denial. In chapter two, I looked to the case of evangelical climate change denial, 
in part as a way to interrogate the claim that ignorance about the science explains the deadlock in 
political response to climate change (arguments such as the one made by Dale Jamieson that I 
also examined in chapter one). Turning to philosophical accounts of ignorance in order to engage 
in this interrogation, I argue that if by ignorance we mean lack of scientific literacy, the argument 
does not go far enough in explaining how evangelical arguments against climate change work, 
how they gain traction, and with what other political imaginaries they resonate. I demonstrate 
that the success of the evangelical strategy lies in its redrawing of the terms of discourse and 
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debate, positioning itself as guardian of the interests of “real science,” and grounding both of 
these moves in the preservation of the evangelical way of life, shot through with market values 
and rationality.  
In chapter three, I examined the recurrent phenomena in the 20th century where a 
prominent environmentalist/scientist engaged in a public debate with a political neoliberal critic 
on the subject of whether they had in some way corrupted scientific practice. Turning to critiques 
on the same grounds of feminist philosophers of science, I argue that the insistence on the 
importance of separating ideology from science in climate change debates cloaks the historically 
contingent formations and meanings of reason and objectivity in the guise of neutrality. A return 
to feminist arguments that the body, values, and connectedness are required to give better 
accounts of the world reveals the limitation of this debate constrained by structural neoliberal 
rationality and frustrated by political neoliberal maneuvering. I also argue that environmental 
science and feminist philosophy are important political/methodological bedfellows. To the extent 
that the Anthropocene reconfigures the boundary between human and nature, we should view 
this as an occasion to also re-examine our diagnostic tools.  
Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which 
norms and concepts of science and neoliberalism permeate our political debates and our ways of 
organizing collective life. For example, debates about climate response often boil down to 
whether a particular policy proposal can generate jobs or boost the economy as a metric of its 
political feasibility, never mind that the Anthropocene may in fact demand completely 
reimagining our relationship to work in the first place. There are many more elements of the 
intertwinement of these dynamics in the context of environmental questions that are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation but are worth noting. Perhaps most importantly, I have left unanswered 
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questions about how neoliberalism as a substantive economic and political philosophy has dealt 
with many of the questions surrounding the norms and concepts that in some way political 
neoliberals in the context of the United States take for granted or deploy without rigor. That the 
figures I read in this dissertation construe the “free” market as natural indeed has consequences 
for all of the places in which they come up against environmentalists, but what did nature or 
natural mean to the “original” neoliberals? This is a question that merits further investigation. 
The case of Friedrich Hayek is particularly pressing—he is cited across the board, to a diverse 
array of ends, by almost every denier who bothers to engage in the practice of citation. Similarly, 
Julian Simon—the economist who publicly contested Paul Ehrlich’s concern over population 
growth—is cited by many more contemporary thinkers and was himself hugely influenced by 
Hayek’s thought.  
It is also worth reiterating that though I spend the bulk of this dissertation deploying 
feminist science studies as a reading practice to develop a new angle on the present, and largely 
gesture to the positive project of developing alternate modes of engagement, this is where I think 
future work will be most generative. To that end I conclude by developing, by way of a slight 
detour through science fiction, what I take to be three crucial criteria to guide work on the 
positive project of developing an imaginary for alternate futures: broad and adventurous reading 
practices, playfulness with our tools for inquiry, and an insistence on reframing the terms of 
debate. I turn to fiction as a way to work through the different valences and shapes of 
imagination at work both in this dissertation and in discourse about the environment generally, in 
part because it already has an imaginative element built into it and as such, is useful as a point of 
comparison. Further, particularly in the case of the genre of climate fiction (cli-fi), authors have 
explicitly tried to do that at which James Hansen claims he failed—to make crystal clear what 
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the evidence suggests we risk by doing nothing—thus is crucial terrain for exploring the 
epistemologies at work in establishing the climate dystopia.  
  
Imagining Feminist Futures 
In order to sketch the criteria I outlined above, I offer here a reading of one particular 
way in which a handful of recent cli-fi novels have grappled with the theme of reason to 
demonstrate that fictionalizing on its own is not sufficient, but that an intentional, critical 
engagement with epistemic practices is also required. A series of opinion pieces in the New York 
Times in July 2014, for example, debated the power of climate change fiction to spur reactions to 
global warming.2 The primary source of disagreement among the authors was whether a 
fictionalized account of the worst-case scenario leaves climate activists vulnerable to critique 
when their predictions fail to materialize, or whether it has an intrinsically self-selecting 
audience and serves to entrench pre-existing views. I argue that in thinking about the role of 
imagination to spur action on climate change, we should pay special attention to the 
epistemologies at work in our imaginaries. Even across these works of fiction, I argue, 
imagination about the future of the human relationship with the planet carries the burden of the 
legacy of the enlightenment. I then conclude by way of drawing out the criteria I have proposed 
                                               
2 George Marshall, “Climate Fiction Will Reinforce Existing Views.” The New York Times, July 
29, 2014; Sheree Renee Thomas, “Imagination Will Help Find Solutions to Climate Change,” 
The New York Times, July 29, 2014; J.P. Telotte, “Science Fiction Reflects Our Anxieties,” The 
New York Times, July 29, 2014; Heidi Cullen, “Personal Stories About Global Warming Change 
Minds,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014; Sean O’Heigartaigh, “Hollywood Global Warming 
Dramas Can Be Misleading,” The New York Times, August 4, 2014; Dan Bloom, “Movies Like 
‘Snowpiercer’ Can Sound the Alarm,” The New York Times, July 30, 2014. 
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through the example of a different kind of science fiction—what Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. 
Conway have called “science-based fiction.”3  
There are many novels that can be categorized as cli-fi, but the selections I offer here are 
three that have been heralded as paradigmatic examples of this kind of fiction in the popular 
press.4 Indeed, journalists have written about these books as texts that need to be seriously 
considered in light of the warning they sound for the consequences should climate change go 
unaddressed. They have also been characterized as distilling complicated scientific hypotheses 
for a wider (and younger) audience, and as carrying exciting potential for rallying people to the 
cause. Returning to Ursula K. Le Guin’s call to action in the epigraph, we must ask whether (and 
which) future alternatives are made possible. It should also be noted that the future of climate 
dystopia is, in each book, not-so-distant. In some cases, it is a future that has already begun – the 
moment of irreversibility or impossibility lives both in the novels’ past, and also in our own. I 
read in each case a struggle on the part of the author to square the promise of the enlightenment 
with the reality of climate change—or in other words, I read each of these novels as grappling 
precisely with the dilemma from Lyndon B. Johnson’s letter in the introduction to this 
dissertation. The common thread between these novels, for our purposes, is that the loss of 
reason is rendered as an effect of environmental destruction. Oreskes and Conway, by contrast, 
                                               
3 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View From the 
Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
4 E.g., Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, “Cli-Fi: Birth of a Genre.” Dissent Magazine, Summer 2013; 
Shara, Tonn, “Cli-Fi—That’s Climate Fiction—Is the New Sci-Fi,” Wired Magazine, July 17, 
2015; J.K. Ullrich, “Climate Fiction: Can Books Save the Planet?” The Atlantic, August 14, 
2015; Angela Evancie, “So Hot Right Now: Has Climate Change Created A New Literary 
Genre?” National Public Radio, April 20, 2013.  
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posit that the criteria for reason itself play a central role in establishing the dystopia in the first 
place.5 	
In J.G. Ballard’s 1962 novel The Drowned World,6 biologist Dr. Robert Kerans makes 
the decision to abandon his post with a United Nations military unit, which is navigating the 
earth via lagoon systems that cover submerged cities, in the wake of solar storms that have 
melted the planet’s ice caps, making tropical areas uninhabitable, forcing mass migration toward 
the poles, eventually leading to their colonization under direction from the UN, and ushering in a 
new Triassic era. Leading up to the departure of the crew’s ship, members of the expedition, 
Kerans included, begin to experience similar dreams that appear to affect their physical and 
mental health. Although the temperatures are rapidly rising, and the submerged city will soon be 
uninhabitable, Kerans, Dr. Bodkin, and Beatrice Dahl all choose to remain in the lagoons above 
what was once London. Each of the three begin to withdraw further into isolation, gradually 
more incapable of separating dream from reality, and feeling compelled to move further south 
toward the uninhabitable area around the equator. 	
During a diving excursion, Kerans confronts death when his air supply is suddenly cut. 
When he comes to above water, he assumes it was an intentional attempt on his life by the pirate 
Strangman who has recently entered the lagoon with his crew of men and giant alligators, only to 
be told that he had wrapped the cord and cut the supply himself. He wonders: “Was the drowned 
world itself, and the mysterious quest for the south which has possessed Hardman, no more than 
                                               
5 Though I do not grapple with her novels here, Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy is 
another example of a kind of playfulness with the tools of inquiry that captures several aspects of 
what I take to be required for the positive project of imagining alternate futures. A close reading 
of these novels merits further investigation; Oryx and Crake (New York: Random House, 2003); 
Year of the Flood (New York: Random House, 2009); MaddAddam (New York: Random House, 
2013). 
6J.G. Ballard, The Drowned World (New York: Liveright Paperback, 2012). 
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an impulse to suicide, an unconscious acceptance of the logic of his own devolutionary descent, 
the ultimate neuronic synthesis of the archaeopsychic zero?”7 Although Ballard does not attribute 
the drowning of the world explicitly to human hubris, he portrays reason and self-preservation as 
intimately linked throughout the novel, positing reason as in some sense the guardian of a 
particular understanding of humanity.  
Nathaniel Rich and Paolo Bacigalupi both depict the fraying of reason in dystopian 
futures that are much closer to the present – the protagonists in both novels make choices that 
others in their lives deem irrational, but that they themselves feel as compulsions rather than as 
options. In Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow,8 gifted mathematician Mitchell Zukor builds a 
successful career calculating risk for corporations on the back of his obsession with cultural 
fears. When a storm - a summer of intense drought, followed by a massive hurricane - floods and 
destroys New York City, Zukor is faced with the choice of returning to the city to help rebuild 
(and incidentally turn a large profit on future risk management), or to remain isolated in 
undeveloped marshland, attempting to feed and shelter himself. For him, the former is not an 
option, and his compulsion toward isolation is incomprehensible to his remaining companions. In 
Bacigalupi’s The Water Knife,9 the American southwest has been decimated by drought, leading 
to increased outbreaks in destructive wildfire and dust storms, and heavily militarized conflict 
over the control of water sources. In Phoenix, a series of high-profile murders lead to the 
exposure of a plot to cut off the city’s access to water completely, abandoning its population - 
most of whom are already destitute. For those without resources, fleeing the impending disaster 
is not a real option. However, there is also a somewhat irrational reluctance of many other 
                                               
7 Ibid, 130. 
8 (New York: Random House, 2015). 
9(New York: Knopf, 2015). 
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residents to leave the city. The pull of self-preservation is weak, and is in some cases, explicitly 
rejected. Journalist Lucy Monroe, who is not even an Arizona native, continuously refuses her 
sister’s plea to join her family in Vancouver, which has not yet felt the effects of climate change 
so acutely. In her narration, she continually acknowledges the irrationality of her own actions, 
and simultaneously feels the impulse to resist death diminish. 	
Although these treatments of reason are less foundational aspects of the worst-case 
scenario for Rich and Bacigalupi, they do consistently call into question what kind of survival we 
will have made possible if we continue down this path. But note the implicit link in these texts 
between the rationality of and the conditions for survival. Where conditions are volatile and 
resources scarce, reason no longer dictates. Characters are consumed with the state of their 
sanity, often at the risk of self-preservation. The rational, self-preserving subject is destabilized, 
and it is unclear in all cases whether any semblance of humanity as we know it will persist. 
Without the rational drive to preservation, relations between humans are fraught, and the impulse 
to protect the species at all disappears. The echo of reason as that which propels not only human 
progress, but basic survival reverberates throughout these novels. These novels do not have 
happy endings, and the uncertainty with which they end is sustained throughout the narratives by 
these cracks in sanity – it is only through the loss of self-preservation through reason that we can 
see the extent to which civilization is at risk. 	
By way of contrast, consider a different example. In a 2014 experimental piece of 
“science-based fiction,” Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway tell the story of the collapse of 
Western civilization from the perspective of a historian in a future civilization.10 The animating 
question of the book is how to explain the collapse of a civilization who knew that collapse was 
                                               
10 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, The Collapse of Western Civilization.  
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imminent. They ask, how should we account for the “shadow of ignorance and denial [that] had 
fallen over people who considered themselves children of the Enlightenment?”11 In part, the 
answer that they give resonates with the reading I have offered throughout the dissertation of the 
sort-of feedback loop between structural and political neoliberalism. They point to several 
different facets of scientific norms and practices as evidence for the failure of Enlightenment 
principles to make good on its promises—and in each case, they highlight the constructed nature 
of these epistemic commitments. They cite the “archaic Western convention of studying the 
physical world in isolation from social systems,”12 physical scientists becoming “entangled in 
arcane arguments about the ‘attribution’ of singular events,”13 scientists “trained as specialists” 
failing to “articulate and convey this broad pattern,”14 the prevalence of the “general 
phenomenon of human adaptive optimism,”15 “the epistemic structure of Western science… 
organized both intellectually and institutionally around ‘disciplines’ in which specialists 
developed a high level of expertise in a small area of inquiry,”16 reductionism and tractability 
impeding “investigations of complex systems,”17 and the dominance of a 95 percent confidence 
limit that “had neither epistemological nor substantive mathematical basis” and can only be 
explained as “a social convention rooted in scientists’ desire to demonstrate their disciplinary 
severity.”18 This piece is a striking illustration of the modes of imagining, imagination, and 
imaginary at work from the critical, feminist perspective. Oreskes and Conway are historians by 
                                               
11 Oreskes and Conway, Collapse, 9.  
12 Ibid, 2. 
13 Ibid, 7. 
14 Ibid, 7. 
15 Ibid, 13. 
16 Ibid, 14. 
17 Ibid, 14. 
18 Ibid, 17. 
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training, and yet their foray into speculative fiction based on scientific research is both an 
exercise in the imagination, and a commentary on the imaginaries that suffuse current political 
discourse and scientific practice. Unlike the novels that portray rationality as the guardian of 
humanity, Oreskes and Conway imagine a role for an alternate set of epistemic criteria. In this 
sense, their book provides a useful landscape for working out the three commitments for which I 
argue.  
First, I argue for broad and adventurous reading practices—in the context of political 
theory, this means a more expansive notion of what counts as a text for political theorizing. This 
recommendation is in part a resistance against being overly disciplined by our disciplinary 
conventions, but also by our institutional arrangements. In the example of the Oreskes and 
Conway book, as historians of science that they write a history from the future that requires them 
to track the development of scientific knowledge and the arrangements of scientific practice is 
unsurprising, in fact, that is their purview as historians of science. That they look to Kim Stanley 
Robinson (a prominent science fiction writer) for inspiration and for substantive thematic 
interventions might be more surprising.19 And yet, Robinson serves as more than mere 
inspiration for the text. They borrow an analytic practice of engaging these themes and 
overarching questions from a text that might otherwise be an unusual methodological source for 
historians. Broad and adventurous reading practices can also help serve decolonial ends vis-à-vis 
the Western canon.20 If we have a more expansive notion of a text, we can cultivate citation 
                                               
19 Kim Stanley Robinson, Forty Signs of Rain, Fifty Degrees Below, and Sixty Days and 
Counting (New York: Spectra Publishers, 2005-2007). 
20 Mignolo, Walter D. and Catherine E. Walsh, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2018). 
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practices that destabilize the idea of “the west” as the center of human creativity, ingenuity, and 
freedom.  
Second, I argue for playfulness with our tools for inquiry—following philosopher Maria 
Lugones, who conceived of playfulness as an orientation that resists the agonistic 
competitiveness of a world structured by rules you had no hand in making, and which your very 
presence contests.21 In her case, it is her subjectivity as both/neither that challenges the status 
quo, yet renders her invisible by its rules. She proposes instead that playfulness be thought of as 
a radical openness:  
We are by the river bank. The river is very, very low. Almost dry. Bits of water 
here and there. Little pools with a few trout hiding under the rocks. But mostly is 
wet stones, grey on the outside. We walk on the stones for awhile. You pick up a 
stone and crash it onto the others. As it breaks, it is quite wet inside and it is very 
colorful, very pretty. I pick up a stone and break it and run toward the pieces to 
see the colors. They are beautiful. I laugh and bring the pieces back to you and 
you are doing the same with your pieces. We keep on crashing stones for hours, 
anxious to see the beautiful new colors. We are playing. The playfulness of our 
activity does not presuppose that there is something like "crashing stones" that is 
a particular form of play with its own rules. Rather the attitude that carries us 
through the activity, a playful attitude, turns the activity into play. Our activity has 
no rules, though it is certainly intentional activity and we both understand what 
we are doing. The playfulness that gives meaning to our activity includes 
uncertainty, but in this case the uncertainty is an openness to surprise. This is a 
particular metaphysical attitude that does not expect the world to be neatly 
packaged, ruly. Rules may fail to explain what we are doing. We are not self-
important, we are not fixed in particular constructions of ourselves, which is part 
of saying that we are open to self-construction. We may not have rules, and when 
we do have rules, there are no rules that are to us sacred. We are not worried 
about competence. We are not wedded to a particular way of doing things. While 
playful we have not abandoned ourselves to, nor are we stuck in, any particular 
"world." We are there creatively.22 
 
                                               
21 Maria Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” Hypatia 2, no. 2 
(Summer 1987): 3-19.  
22 Lugones, “Playfulness,” 16 
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This extensive quote (or perhaps unusual quoting practice) is instructive for several 
reasons. In the spirit of creative openness, the example itself is crucial to the elaboration of the 
concept. There is an affective dimension to the openness of playfulness, but it is also tactile and 
aesthetic. It describes processes of meaning-making where the meaning need not be—in fact, 
ought not be—predetermined, and where those processes are dynamic and interactive. That we 
may remake ourselves, remake the world, as we remake our tools is part of the imaginative 
process that we should embrace. 
Oreskes and Conway play a bit with this idea in their book. One way to read their 
assessment of the ways in which the Enlightenment failed to make good on its promises is that 
the West refused to be open to remaking itself. Somewhat paradoxically even, the societies that 
did survive the collapse of the West were the Authoritarian ones. As they tell it, a bull-headed 
commitment to an abstract notion of freedom both undermined the democratic institutions that 
were ostensibly meant to secure this freedom, at the same time as it ran up against its own 
material limits. I argue that we should understand this failure as a failure to be playful. But 
Oreskes and Conway are also playing themselves in this text. In addition to employing broad 
reading practices, they are playing with the conventions and rules of their discipline in a way that 
allows them to be more expansive in their diagnoses, and more creative in imagining solutions. 
From the vantage point of a future historian, unmoored from the requirements of 95% 
confidence, monocausal explanations, and reductionism, they can tell a story about our moment 
that interweaves counter-veiling forces, treats counterfactuals with some rigor, and that 
effectively challenges some of the dominant norms and concepts taken for granted in the West as 
natural and inevitable, or as required for the preservation of the species.  
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Finally, I argue for an insistence on redefining the terms of debate. Another assessment 
Oreskes and Conway make regarding the future collapse of Western civilization was a failure to 
take seriously critical engagements with the sciences. Scientists themselves were part of this 
problem – in failing to recognize some of their tools for inquiry as social conventions rather than 
as necessary for knowledge production, they failed to have an expansive enough view of what 
counted as evidence. But the institutional arrangements of scientific research and knowledge 
production were also culpable. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, to double-down on 
neutrality as a measure of scientific authority is to preserve the status-quo of institutional 
arrangements that structure the production of scientific knowledge under its current logics and 
rubrics.   
What would it mean to redefine or reframe the terms of debate away from those of 
preventing the encroachment of ideology or bias? Recent work in indigenous philosophy and 
environmental justice is instructive on this. To reframe the Anthropocene as already a climate-
dystopia for peoples whose societies have already been transformed through colonial violence,23 
or to demand that communities play an active role in directing research relative to their access to 
environmental goods or exposure to environmental harms,24 is to commit upfront to a set of 
values that guide the process of knowledge production other than those styled as neutral. And 
further, it allows for imagining criteria for knowledge production that takes seriously the role 




                                               
23 Kyle Whyte, “Indigenous Science (Fiction) for the Anthropocene: Ancestral Dystopias and 
Fantasies of Climate Change Crises,” Nature and Space 1, no. 1-2 (2018): 224-242. 
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